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Computer systems employed in the Department ofDefense (DoD) for processing
classified electronic mail (email) generally operate at the highest classification level of the
data being processed. These system high implementations cause two significant problems:
all users must be granted unnecessarily high security clearances, and separate,
incompatible workstations and networks exist for users to process classified data at
different security levels. To solve these problems a System/Subsystem Specification (SSS)
and a System Security Engineering (SSE) approach has been used to design a High
Assurance, Multilevel Secure Mail Server (HAMMS).
This thesis presents the architecture, mailing capabilities, and required design
characteristics necessary to develop a high assurance mail server. Existing high assurance
and information security systems are analyzed to identify related design advantages and
disadvantages for a high assurance mail sever. Also included is the initialization,
adaptation, and employment of a media encryption device and associated software that
will be adapted to extend secure mail operations to a Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS)
workstation.
The result of the research is a system design that can be employed to provide a
high assurance multilevel email server and a reduction in the number of workstations,
incompatible networks, and user clearances required in secure environments. In the
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Analysis and design of label-based mail handling is essential for meeting the
Department ofDefense (DoD) and the Department of the Navy (DoN) security
requirements in multilevel environments. Requirements in such environments include
trusted labeling, accurate delivery, and use of various mail protocols on a high assurance
system.
Today, many DoD and DoN offices are tasked with processing mail from multiple
classification and compartment categories. Current mailers, operating in a classified
environment, generally run at system high resulting in multiple, incompatible applications
and networks. Due to the incompatibility among these systems, users commonly maintain
and use a separate workstation for each of these systems.
Offices that process various levels of classified and compartmented mail require
high assurance multilevel mail systems. High assurance multilevel systems have been
developed within the DoD, however these systems are mainly used to provide
connectivity between system high networks. Additionally, if these offices do use high
assurance multilevel systems, those systems generally lack the ability to view mail
dominated by the user's current session level.
Due to cost, development time, maintenance, and training required, proposed
solutions should support the use of existing commercial-of-the shelf (COTS) mail
applications and network configurations, where feasible, with minimal impact to DoD and
DoN resources and users.
B. SCOPE
The principal objectives of this thesis include:
• development of a System Specification documenting the design
requirements of the High Assurance, Multilevel Secure Mail Server
(HAMMS)
• development of a prototype implementation supporting a concept
demonstration ofHAMMS based upon the Wang Federal Inc. XTS-
300.
A detailed presentation of the core concepts and elements of Multilevel Secure
(MLS) systems are provided to support the comprehension, design, and development of
HAMMS. Due to the use of the XTS-300 as the high assurance base for HAMMS, the
architecture, capabilities, and application of the XTS-300 within the DoD are also
documented. A Systems Engineering Process (SEP) has been adapted and applied to
provide a documented methodology to support the development of secure systems such as
HAMMS. The capabilities, functionality, and initialization procedures of the Media
Encryption Management System (MEMS) with MESA/MEDIA Encryption Board (MEB)
are included to provide potential high assurance capabilities for HAMMS workstations.
Analysis of a FORTEZZA-enabled platform was conducted to document why a high
assurance base is essential when handling classified data.
The research and development described in the previous paragraph have supported
the detailed documentation of the HAMMS System Specification. These efforts have also
resulted in the successful concept demonstration of the HAMMS prototype.
C. OVERVIEW OF CHAPTERS
1. Introduction
Chapter I discusses the purpose and scope of the thesis. An overview of the
following additional chapters is provided: Chapter II - Multilevel Secure (MLS) Systems;
Chapter III - XTS-300 Architecture and Application in the DoD; Chapter IV - High
Assurance, Multilevel Secure Mail Server (HAMMS); Chapter V Conclusions and
Recommendations. Additionally, an overview of the following appendices is provided:
Appendix A - High Assurance, Multilevel Secure Mail Server (HAMMS) System
Specification; Appendix B - Applying the Systems Engineering Process to Computer
Security; Appendix C - Media Encryption Management System (MEMS) with
MESA/MEDIA Encryption Board (MEB); Appendix D - Subversion of a FORTEZZA-
enabled platform.
2. Multilevel Secure (MLS) Systems
MLS systems have been developed to satisfy user security and protection
requirements for data of multiple security classifications and compartments. This chapter
will serve to identify MLS systems and associated properties that are applicable in most
user environments. Specifically, background ofMLS systems, components of such
systems, essential elements and their characteristics, and security models relating to MLS
system are addressed to support the design and development ofHAMMS.
3. XTS-300 Architecture and Application in the DoD
The Wang Federal Incorporated XTS-300 system received a Trusted Computer
System Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC) B3 rating after evaluation by the National Computer
Security Center (NCSC). Chapter III describes the design and architecture of this secure
system that is used to provide the high assurance base for HAMMS. An overview of the
system hardware, software, Trusted Computing Base (TCB) protected resources and
mechanisms, and assurance is included. The chapter concludes with a description ofXTS
system configurations and use in DoD systems.
4. The High Assurance, Multilevel Secure Mail Service (HAMMS)
Chapter IV documents the status of the HAMMS development. The purpose of
the HAMMS is to provide a trusted, multilevel mail service in a LAN environment. The
concept of the trusted mail service is to allow system users to view all label-based mail
authorized by system security policies. This chapter includes a description of the specific
system hardware and software configurations used and developed in support of the
integration and concept demonstration ofHAMMS.
5. Conclusions and Recommendations
a. Conclusions
Chapter V contains the conclusions for the use and development of the
HAMMS. The conclusions center on the feasibility of integrating the HAMMS, based on
the XTS family architecture, into a LAN as a mail server.
b. Recommendations
The recommendations include approaches relating to future research areas
involving the HAMMS.
D. OVERVIEW OF APPENDICES
1. Appendix A - The High Assurance, Multilevel Secure Mail Service
(HAMMS) System Specification
Appendix A is a System Specification developed in accordance with references
[10] and [25]. The purpose of the System Specification is to provide the performance
level requirements specification of the HAMMS. The System Specification is designed as
a performance specification to minimize detailed implementation restrictions and to
maximize clarity regarding system requirements. This methodology supports future
research efforts without restricting design avenues. System requirements details are
provided where necessary to establish environment and performance characteristics
essential to the HAMMS.
2. Appendix B - Applying the Systems Engineering Process to Computer
Security
This appendix describes a systems engineering methodology known as the Systems
Engineering Process (SEP) and illustrates the application of that process to secure
systems development. The Requirements Analysis, Functional Analysis/Allocation,
Synthesis, and Systems Analysis and Control components of the SEP are presented. The
goal of the SEP is to accept process inputs (e.g. system requirements, customer needs),
apply the iterative and recursive elements of the SEP through a team approach, and to
produce the expected process outputs (e.g. balanced system solutions, decision database).
Appendix B demonstrates how the SEP can be utilized to support the development of a
secure system or secure system functionality (e.g. HAMMS).
3. Appendix C - The Media Encryption Management System (MEMS)
with Mesa/Media Encryption Board (MEB)
Appendix C covers research done on the Media Encryption Management System
(MEMS) with Mesa/Media Encryption Board (MEB). The MEMS is a software package
that utilizes an encryption device to encrypt selected storage media in its entirety or in
part. The MEMS/Mesa/MEB is an encryption system that, when initiated, takes over a
computer's boot process to provide assurance that there is no malicious software
interrupting secure operations. The appendix provides the documented operating
instructions relating to board initialization and use. The appendix concludes with an
assessment of other relevant uses of this hardware and software that may be applied to
future HAMMS development efforts.
4. Appendix D - Subversion of a FORTEZZA-Enabled Platform
This appendix provides an example that supports the position that it is prudent to
apply the notions the Reference Monitor (RM) concept on systems that are processing
classified data. Although the intent of the Multilevel Information Systems Security
Initiative (MISSI) is to provide information systems security capabilities in various
environments, those capabilities can be diminished significantly if the supporting
architecture is fundamentally insecure. This appendix addresses the MISSI configuration
that was examined and presents the details of a successful attack against that configuration
including the specific software modifications necessary. Finally, the appendix concludes
with an assessment of the assurance that should be placed in such a configuration.
II. MULTILEVEL SECURE (MLS) SYSTEMS
A. INTRODUCTION
The DoD systems established to process and protect classified data have been
developed to meet the security restrictions and handling requirements of such data. The
security systems developed include: manual systems processing a single or a range of
security classifications; automated systems involving computer hardware and software
processing or operating at a single (e.g. the highest level at which the systems processes)
security level; automated computer systems processing multiple security levels of data.
The amount of classified and sensitive data processed in the DoD continues to
increase. Additionally, new forms of data, labeled with differing security classifications
and compartments, are regularly introduced. These data are being handled by increasing
numbers of computer systems in place of manual systems. These circumstances provide
requirements for MLS systems which must be understood and developed for DoD users.
B. OVERVIEW
This chapter provides information relating to the development ofMLS systems and
the components of those systems. These systems serve to satisfy user security and data
protection requirements. Components of MLS systems and their associated properties
will be identified. Security policies, modes of operation, and essential elements and their
characteristics will be addressed.
Although most users requiring these types of systems exist in the government
realm, there also is interest in the commercial sector. Additionally, there continues to be
increased pressure resulting from today's fiscal environment that emphasizes a team
approach between the government and the commercial sector. A teaming between the
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government and the commercial sector can aid the understanding of requirements and
capabilities, develop common solutions, and produce systems within fiscal constraints.
These factors provide additional justification for understanding the essential components
and uses of MLS systems .
C. BACKGROUND OF MLS DEVELOPMENT
Historically, the majority ofDoD systems have been designed to either protect one
level of classified data in accordance with the security requirements of that single level
data, or to protect multiple levels of classified data in accordance with the security
requirements of the highest level data. The data processed by the DoD is generally
categorized by a combination of hierarchical classification levels and other nonhierarchical
structures or compartments. Figure 1 provides an example of historical DoD
classifications and several compartments typically used. Data may be labeled with one
classification label and zero or more compartments to form the data's sensitivity label (e.g.
Top Secret [], Top Secret [Nuclear, NATO], Secret [NATO, Crypto]). In order to
process and store this data, requirements for systems capable of identifying and relating
between the various levels have emerged.
CLASSIFICATIONS AND COMPARTMENTS

















Figure 1 Example of DoD Security Classifications and Compartments
The alternatives to multilevel handling approaches are to either process all data as
if that data required the restrictions of the highest classifications and all nonhierarchical
compartments or to have a separate system, manual or automated, for each classification
level and possibly each nonhierarchical compartment. The first alternative requires that all
users of the system be granted the highest clearance and be processed into all
nonhierarchical compartments. The second alternative requires multiple systems
essentially performing the same tasks for each category of data.
In the late 1960's and early 1970's, DoD requirements to handle multilevel data
began to emerge. "Until that time it was against regulations to process classified
information on a system to which uncleared people had access, because no machine was
trusted to protect the classified data." [Ref. 6, p. 63] These DoD requirements would lead
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to the development of systems required to enforce security policies in environments with
users possessing various clearance levels and data of different classifications and
compartments. These MLS systems would be required to protect the data entrusted to
them and determine whether a user or other system component should be granted
permission to process labeled data with one classification category and either zero, one, or
multiple compartment labels.
The essential elements ofMLS systems include labeled data, a form of modeled
users and associated permissions and clearances, processes acting on behalf of those users,
a modeled security policy (or multiple nonconflicting security policies), the required host
hardware and operating systems, and associated peripherals. The objectives that MLS
systems must meet include security policy enforcement and system usability. The former
is required to protect the data within the system, and the latter is needed to insure the
system is usable.
D. MODES OF OPERATION
Within DoD, there are essentially five modes of operation that have been used for
systems processing classified information. An accurate understanding of the definitions
and restrictions of the modes is essential when characterizing secure systems in terms of
requirements definitions, systems capabilities, and systems evaluations. These five modes
used by DoD are commonly referred to as dedicated, system high, partitioned or
compartmented, multilevel, and controlled. These modes are characterized according to
the minimum user clearances and the maximum security levels of data either processed or
transferred by the systems.
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1. Dedicated Mode
Dedicated mode is an operational mode that requires that all users have clearances
at least equal to the highest level of data under control, all users meet need-to-know
requirements, and the users have been formally granted authorization to access the data.
The dedicated mode system is designed to handle only one compartment or classification
of data.
Dedicated Mode - An AIS is operating in the dedicated mode when each
user with direct or indirect individual access to the AIS, its peripherals,
remote terminals, or remote hosts, has all of the following:
a. A valid personnel clearance for all information on the system.
b. Formal access approval for, and has signed nondisclosure agreements
for all the information stored and/or processed (including all compartments,
subcompartments and/or special access programs).
c. A valid need-to-know for all information contained within the system.
[Ref. 15, pp. 28-29]
2. System High Mode
System high mode involves the system operating at the highest classification of
data processed within that system. Additionally, all users must possess a clearance no
lower than the highest classification of data processed by that system. The system,
however, can be trusted to provide separation of compartments or need-to-know
protection between users.
System-High Mode - An AIS is operating in the system-high mode when
each user with direct or indirect individual access to the AIS, its
peripherals, remote terminals, or remote hosts, has all of the following:
a. A valid personnel clearance for all information on the AIS.
b. Formal access approval for, and has signed nondisclosure agreements
for all the information stored and/or processed (including all compartments,
subcompartments and/or special access programs).
c. A valid need-to-know for some of the information contained within the
AIS. [Ref. 15, p. 29]
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3. Compartmented Mode
In the partitioned or compartmented mode, all users have clearances for all data
under control but may not have been granted formal authorization to access all data. "This
mode allows the system to process two or more types of compartmented information or
any one type of compartmented information with other than compartmented information"
[Ref. 22, p. 3].
Compartmented Mode - An AIS is operating in the compartmented-high
mode when each user with direct or indirect individual access to the AIS,
its peripherals, remote terminals, or remote hosts, has all of the following:
a. A valid personnel clearance for the most restricted information
processed in the AIS.
b. Formal access approval for, and has signed nondisclosure agreements
for that information to which he/she is to have access.
c. A valid need-to-know for that information that they are to have access.
[Ref 15, pp. 29]
A typical scenario for compartmented mode is that all users have Top Secret
clearances but they have not been granted access to all compartments. This is common in
most intelligence organizations processing data from a range of classifications and
compartments. All users have the highest clearances but don't have a need to know for all
data and therefore are not granted access to all compartments.
4. Multilevel Mode
In the multilevel mode, all users may not even have the highest level of
classification associated with the data being controlled in addition to not having access to
all compartments. It is this multilevel mode that allows data of two or more classification
levels to be processed simultaneously and requires the system to separate and protect the
data of different levels in accordance with the implemented security policies and user
characteristics (clearances, authorizations, etc.).
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Multilevel Mode - An AIS is operating in the multilevel mode when all of
the following statements are satisfied concerning the users with direct or
indirect individual access to the AIS, its peripherals, remote terminals, or
remote hosts:
a. Some do not have a valid personnel clearance for all of the information
processed in the AIS.
b. All have the proper clearance and have the appropriate formal access
approval for that information to which he/she is to have access.
c. A valid need-to-know for that information to which they are to have
access. [Ref. 15, pp. 28-29]
5. Controlled Mode
The controlled mode is a form ofMLS but "a more limited amount of trust is
placed in the hardware and software of the system" [Ref. 22, p. 3]. This mode may
involve restrictions on levels (classifications and clearances) supported.
E. COMPONENTS OF MLS SYSTEMS
MLS systems are required to protect data of varying sensitivity levels. Due to the
fact that there is value placed upon this data and that these systems may require
evaluation, these systems, and the development processes that produce them, must be well
defined. The components of these systems must likewise be well defined if the overall
system is to be documented, evaluated, and used.
1. Objects
Possibly the most important, or arguably the most valuable element of any system
is the data stored within. If it were not for the existence or potential existence of the data,
there would be no requirement to develop the system in the first place.
The term object is generally used to refer to passive entities in the system. Such
entities include files, directories, and databases. These are forms of data that are acted
upon by other components in the computer system. Although devices, sockets, processes,
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and windows integrated and employed by the system may not be initially perceived as
passive entities, they can also be considered as objects. They too are acted upon by other
entities in the system.
All of these passive entities contain or receive data of some form. If a user has
access to an object then this access implies that the user has access to the data that the
object contains.
2. Subjects
The term subject is used to describe an active entity in a computer system.
Obviously, these too are critical components of computer systems as it is subjects that
access, modify, delete, create, and otherwise act upon both passive and active entities in
the MLS system.
Among the components of the system that can be considered subjects are users or
modeled users, processes, and executable programs. Subjects are responsible for
information flow between objects and can also cause a change in the state of the system.
3. Security Policy Models
The United States Government (USG), principally the DoD, has been the primary
user ofMLS systems. The original security policy to be modeled, and actually
implemented in MLS systems, was the overall military security policy.
a. The Bell - LaPadula (BLP) Model
"The first mathematical model of a multilevel secure computer system,
known as the Bell and LaPadula (BLP) model, defined a number of terms and concepts
that have since been adopted by most other models of multilevel security." [Ref 6, pg. 66]
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Although the BLP model was developed in the early seventies, it remains an appropriate
representation for DoD MLS systems.
There are two basic properties that are represented in most DoD MLS
systems employing versions of the BLP model. The first property, the simple security
property, is used to prevent a subject (active entity) from reading an object (passive entity)
when the classification of the subject does not dominate (e.g. Top Secret dominates
Secret) the classification of the object. The simple security property is also known as the
no-read-up property. A subject is allowed to read objects of equal or lower classification
but not objects of greater classification. The second property, the confinement property,
also known as the * property or no-write-down property, is used to prevent a subject from
writing to an object if the classification of the object does not dominate the classification
of the subject. A subject is allowed to write to objects of equal or greater classifications
but not objects of lower classification.
To understand these basic properties of the BLP model, consider the DoD
hierarchical classification levels: Unclassified, Confidential, Secret, Top Secret. Ifwe also
consider subject SI, session level Confidential, subject S2, session level Secret, object
01, classified Unclassified, and object 02 classified Top Secret we can determine the
information flow allowed by the BLP model. SI and S2 can read from 01 and write to
02. SI and S2 cannot read from 02 (no-read-up property) or write to 01 {no-write-
down property) (see Figure 2). Clearly, the BLP model was designed to protect against













X = Not Allowed
Figure 2 BLP No-Read-Up and No-Write-Down Illustration
b. The Biba Integrity Model
By the mid seventies a second mathematical model emerged to address the
control of information flow with respect to data integrity. The Biba integrity model stated
two basic properties very similar to the BLP model. However, the Biba model rules,
present an orthogonal perspective when compared to the BLP model rules. The first rule,
the simple integrity rule, is used to prevent a subject from writing to an object if the
integrity level of the subject does not dominate the integrity level of the object. The
simple integrity rule is also known as the no-write-up property . A subject is allowed to
write to objects of equal or lower integrity but not objects of greater integrity. The
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second rule, the integrity confinement rule, also known as the no-read-down property
(a.k.a. the * integrity property), is used to prevent a subject from reading from an object
if the integrity level of the object does not dominate the integrity level of the subject. A
subject is allowed to read from an object of equal or greater integrity but not from objects
of lower integrity.
The integrity levels must be differentiated from the classification levels
previously used due to the method of their employment in this model and their overall
meaning. Consider integrity levels A, B, C, and D which are related linearly from highest
(A) to lowest (D). To determine the information flow allowed by the Biba model consider
subject SI, integrity C, subject S2, integrity B, object 01, integrity D, and object 02
integrity A. SI and S2 can write to Ol and read from 02. SI and S2 cannot write to 02
{no-write-up property) or read from 01 {no-read-down property) (see Figure 3). As in















X = Not Allowed
4.
Figure 3 Biba No-Read- Down and No-Write-Up Dlustration
Access Control
Active and passive entities are modeled in MLS systems to support the goals of
imposing a successful implementation of a security policy on the systems and the resources
being protected. The two principle types of access control reflect two types of policy:
discretionary and mandatory.
a. Discretionary Access Control (DAC)
This access control method "provides a means of restricting access to
objects based upon the identity and need-to-know of the user, process and/or groups to
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which they belong" [Ref. 8, p. 14]. In this context, the term discretionary refers to the fact
that a subject may be capable of passing access permission to another subject. If the user
or subject has sufficient rights then that entity could grant access to another active entity
within the system. DAC is a common access control method known to most users of
computer systems designed to share data among users and possibly various sites.
A common method of implementing DAC is to add access control
information in the form indicated by Figure 4. The added information represents the
several different classes of users. This method or an alternative form of Access Control
List (ACL) can provide lists of users and groups and the privileges that they possess. The
user of the data can be authorized to grant read, write, and execute privileges to various
users or groups of users. Since proliferation of access rights is left to the discretion of the
user, additional access control mechanisms are required of systems protecting sensitive
data that is not intended to allow access to all users.
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DISCRETIONARY ACCESS CONTROL SCHEME
' Owner ' Group ' World '




Figure 4 Typical DAC Privileges
b. Mandatory Access Control (MAC)
The goals ofMLS systems within DoD generally are to provide controlled
access to data but to not unnecessarily burden or prevent the systems' users from
accessing data that they are authorized to access. These systems can be implementations
of existing manual control systems that may no longer be appropriate due to increased use
of computing resources, changing environment configurations, increasing database
volume, and changing force manpower structures. In addition, these systems may
provide automated implementations satisfying completely new user requirements.
MAC provides "a means of restricting access to objects based on the
sensitivity (as represented by a label) of the information contained in the objects and the
formal authorization (i.e. clearance) of subjects to access information of such sensitivity"
[Ref. 8, p. 28]. MAC mechanisms have been developed to control access to data in
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scenarios where all users may not have sufficient rights or needs to access that data.
Generally the security attributes on the data, and the subjects representing the users
themselves, are fixed. The software security mechanisms or a user with sufficient rights
(e.g. system administrator) assign and determine the security attributes. Access is granted
based upon those attributes. Unlike DAC, MAC does not normally allow the attributes to
be modified by system users.
MLS systems include MAC mechanisms that assign sensitivity labels to all
of the objects and subjects in the system. "A user's sensitivity label specifies the sensitivity
level, or level of trust, associated with that user; it's often called a clearance. A file's
sensitivity label specifies the level of trust that a user must have to be able to access that
file." [Ref. 8, pg. 72] Labels are used by MAC to determine which users can access what
data. If the user's label dominates the file label, the user may be granted access (see Figure
5).
MANDATORY ACCESS CONTROL SCHEME
Sensitivity Label:





Figure 5 MAC Authorization
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5. The TCB Concept
The intent of the TCB concept is to provide a layer, or several layers, of
abstraction and mediation between the underlying hardware, the operating system, and the
associated applications. The degree or type of separation (i.e. hardware or software)
between the layers is implementation dependent.
Figure 6 provides an example of an ideal TCB architecture to support a MLS
system of high assurance. The TCB model supports the notion of Abstract Data Types
(ADTs), a Reference Validation Mechanism (RVM), and Supporting Security Functions
(SSFs). The implemented ADTs and RVMs are commonly referred to as the Security
Kernel (SK). The intent of the TCB model is to provide mediation, access control,
auditing and logging, and other SSFs.
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Figure 6 TCB Model
It is the Reference Monitor (RM) concept within the TCB model which serves to
control access to system data. The RM functionality is defined to support three essential
requirements: it is small enough to be verifiable, it mediates every access, and it is
tamperproof. The intent of using or requiring such a model is to determine the level of
assurance at the lowest architectural layer (i.e. security kernel) and then to use that
information as the foundation for determining the overall assurance of the entire system.
If a high level of assurance is required of the system, then a secure structure should be
developed at the lowest architectural level possible.
Subjects request access to objects and it is the RM that mediates that access
request. Upon verification through checks of the authorization database, the subject's
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request is granted access to the object if sufficient rights were verified. Otherwise, the















Figure 7 RM Mediation
Although models of previous manual systems may remain appropriate, automation
of the techniques of implementation is required to maximize the advantages gained from
the use of the TCB and its features. An example ofhow past manual methods can be
replaced with implemented TCBs is the reviewing of classified files. Previously the files,
contained in separate safes, would be accessed via one or two person control to the safe.
The person requiring access to several files, where each file was from a different
classification category, would be required to access each of the safes storing each
classification category. This process required the person to understand the access controls
of each data container. Additionally, the access control mechanisms generally provided
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protection over only one container. A MLS system could be implemented to protect all of
the files with the same security mechanism structure, and the person requiring access
could retrieve files authorized from his current access level without requiring multiple
queries for the files.
F. MLS TCSEC CATEGORIES
In order to determine the level of protection provided by systems possibly
operating in one of the modes described in section D of this chapter, the DoD has
developed a set of evaluation criteria to assess trusted computer systems and this criteria is
documented in reference [12], also know as the Orange Book. MLS systems fall within
the Division B, Mandatory Protection, and Division A, Verified Protection, categories of
this criteria. The classes within these divisions are Bl, Labeled Security Protection; B2,
Structured Protection; B3, Security Domains; and Al, Verified Design. Class Al
provides the highest level of assurance among these classes. Mandatory Access Control
(MAC), which requires the system (instead of the user) to determine access control based
upon user authorizations and subject and object access control labels, is required at the Bl
level and above (see Table 1). It is at the B2 level, however, that the Trusted Computing
Base (TCB) model becomes a key characteristic of the MLS system.
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Table 1 Trusted System Evaluation Criteria Ratings
Al Verified Design Formal top-level specification and verification, formal covert
channel analysis, informal code correspondence demonstration




Formal model, covert channels constrained, security -oriented
architecture, "relatively resistant to penetration"
Bl Labeled Security
Protection













G. EVALUATION OF MLS SYSTEMS
The evaluation ofMLS and other trusted products is conducted by the National
Computer Security Center (NCSC). These evaluations focus on the security capabilities
required of these systems against the established criteria listed in reference [12].
Table 2 provides a summary of the TCSEC categories. Reference [12], also
known as the Aqua Book, provides additional guidance, relating to trusted product
evaluations, for vendors. The specific phases involved in such evaluations include the
proposal review phase, the vendor assistance phase, the design analysis phase, the
evaluation phase, and the rating maintenance phase. Due to the schedule and fiscal
impacts involved in evaluating secure systems, the evaluation phases and their associated
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requirements should be understood those parties responsible for developing and managing
the system. Although the phases include sound engineering practices, systems should not
be submitted for evaluation unless high assurance is a specific system requirement and the
development team understands the evaluation process and its implications.
Table 2 TCSEC Requirements From Ref. [8, p. 113]
CI C2 Bl B2 B3 Al
Discretionary Access Control X X * * X *
Object Reuse X * * * *
Labels X X * *
Label Integrity X * * *
Exportation of Labeled Information X * * *
Exportation of Multilevel Devices X * * *
Exportation of Single-Level Devices X * * *
Labeling ofHuman-Readable Output X * * *
Mandatory Access Control X X * *
Subject Sensitivity Labels X * *
Device Labels X * *
Identification and Authentication X X X * * *
Audit X X X X *
Trusted Path X X *
System Architecture X X X X X *
System Integrity X * * * * *
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CI C2 Bl B2 B3 Al
System Testing X X X X X X
Design Specification and Verification X X X X
Covert Channel Analysis X X X
Trusted Facility Management X X *
Configuration Management X * X
Trusted Recovery X *
Trusted Distribution X
Security Features User's Guide X * * * * *
Trusted Facility Manual X X X X X *
Test Documentation X * * X * X
Design Documentation X * X X X X
X - New or Enhanced Reqijirements for thisC ass
*
- No Additional Requirements for this Class
No Entry - No Requirements for this Class
1. The Proposal Review Phase (PRP)
This phase involves meetings between the vendor and the National Security
Agency's (NSA) Information System Security Organization (ISSO). The goal of this
phase is to produce a signed agreement, between the vendor and the ISSO, to proceed
with system design and evaluation. The vendor must also sign a disclosure statement
indicating that the company is not owned or controlled by foreign interests. Additionally,
basic coordination information including the targeted class, the security requirements of
the system, and the proposed development schedule must be provided by the developer.
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2. The Vendor Assistance Phase (VAP)
During this phase, the vendor "develops the system, designs security test
procedures, and writes draft documentation. The NCSC team provides support during
this phase by answering questions during the completion of system design and
implementation" [Ref. 8, p. 328]. The significant elements of the phase encompass
establishing a firm schedule for the deliverables of the phase and actually delivering the
design documentation, test plans, and the rating maintenance phase plan.
3. The Design Analysis Phase (DAP)
This is the phase where the NCSC evaluation team performs an in-depth
examination of the design of the product. The evaluation team produces an Initial Product
Assessment Report (IPAR) which details the evaluation thus far and provides a rating that
the system is expected to receive pending the results of the formal evaluation phase.
4. The Evaluation Phase
Finally, if all previous phases have progressed successfully, the evaluation team
conducts the detailed analysis of the hardware, software, and final versions of the
documentation. Extensive functional and penetration testing is conducted as required.
The system's security features and assurances are compared against the criteria of the
targeted class and documented. A significant document produced from this phase is the
Final Evaluation Report (FER). The FER documents the evaluation process employed, an
overview of the product, and the results of the evaluation. If the evaluation has been
successful, the NCSC indicates such on the Evaluated Product List (EPL).
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5. The Rating Maintenance Phase (RAMP)
After the product has been assigned a rating resulting from a successful evaluation,
changes to the system must be made in a trusted manner. This approach assists
evaluations of the change, avoids the reexamination of the entire system, and keeps the
EPL current.
H. CERTIFICATION AND ACCREDITATION OF MLS SYSTEMS
The evaluation process is a major step towards determining the technical
capabilities of the system. However, that process does not result in approval or
authorization to use the system to process sensitive data.
Additional assessments must be performed to determine if the system is
appropriate for handling specific sensitive data. Certification is the process of performing
such a technical assessment and accreditation is the actual formal approval from the
government to use the system for specific data and purposes. Specifically, the Designated
Approving Authority (DAA) declares that the system is "approved to operate in a
particular security mode using a prescribed set of safeguards" [Ref. 15, p. 4].
I. USES OF MLS SYSTEMS
Since the components and characteristics ofMLS systems have been described, it
is appropriate to examine areas where MLS systems, or components thereof, may be
employed. Today MLS systems are used to allow systems operating at different
classification levels to interact; to provide secure solutions for hosts, workstations,
database management systems (DBMS), and networks; and to meet user operational
requirements through the integration of different components with MLS systems.
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1. Hosts
The MLS host plays a critical role in the overall MLS system. The security policy,
TCB, data storage, and access control and transfer mechanisms may reside principally at
the MLS host or on multiple MLS hosts. Therefore, the MLS host assessment is most
important when determining the system assurance.
2. Guards
MLS guards are generally used to control information flow across security
boundaries of differing systems. These guards may exist between MLS systems and single
level systems, or between MLS systems that have an intersection of security levels for data
that they process. The MLS guard serves as a bridge and may provide single or bi-
directional filters. Bi-directional MLS guards may provide additional capabilities and
reliability (i.e. the ability to receive acknowledgments for data transferred) but naturally
are more complex and require additional scrutiny.
3. CMWs
There are various user interfaces to MLS systems which may include a command
line interface at the workstation or possibly the Compartmented Mode Workstation
(CMW). The CMW generally provides an X Window interface for the user. These
workstations can allow a user to have several windows of data of differing classifications
open simultaneously but they provide separation protection between the various windows
through security policy enforcement. The user sets his session level via his CMW when
logging in. Additionally, the CMW provides interface tools and domain separation which
allow the user to change his session level without closing windows or logging out. This
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concept is a significant interface improvement over the implementation techniques of early
systems which were more cumbersome for the user.
Significant development work in the area of user and administrator workstations
and interfaces remains to be accomplished. CMWs are effectively Class Bl systems.
Reference [1] discusses the application of such compartmented mode designs and
concludes that a system must meet B2 TCSEC criteria at a minimum if that system is
handling compartmented data.
4. Networks
MLS networks can provide more capability to meet today's user requirements than
stand alone MLS systems. These networks may be connected by single or multilevel
devices or ports. "MLS networks can interconnect single-level or multilevel components
on a shared network infrastructure by providing sensitivity labels and network security
services for the data transferred between systems." [Ref. 23] However, all of the
interconnected network components must be analyzed, with respect to their security
policies implementations and enforcement mechanisms, in order to determine the security
capabilities and limitations of the overall network.
In addition to typical commercial network components such as connection
medium, servers, bridges, routers, and gateways, the MLS network may include
encryption devices. These encryption devices can further enhance network capabilities by
encrypting data prior to transmission to another component of the network. This allows
for the possibility of transmitting multiple levels of data over a single communications
medium since the level (or levels) of the data has been effectively reduced to a single level
(possibly Unclassified) via encryption. Additionally, encryption devices coupled with
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MLS networks may allow the use of transmission paths (e.g. commercial networks,
satellite communications) for the transfer of classified data that would not be feasible prior
to incorporating encryption devices. Again, a security evaluation of the implementation of
these devices within the network must be performed to determine the level of assurance
that should be placed on network.
5. DBMSs
"MLS DBMSs provide the management, storage, and retrieval of multiple levels of
related data, allowing users of different security levels to have access to a shared set of
data according to their individual authorizations" [Ref. 23]. Security policies for these
applications must support policy enforcement for typically modeled DBMS actions such as
queries, views, record manipulations, and table construction. The DBMS area of
applications for MLS systems can be expected to experience significant growth in the
future due to the increase in electronic storage of classified data, proliferation of computer
systems, and user demands for timely and consistent data retrieval.
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III. XTS-300 ARCHITECTURE AND APPLICATION IN THE DOD
A. HISTORY
The Wang Federal Incorporated XTS-300 and its operating system, the STOP 4.3,
evolved from the XTS-200 and STOP versions 3.1.E, 3.2.E and 4. 1 . They are the
descendants of the Secure Communications Processor (SCOMP) which was developed by
HFSI (formerly Honeywell Federal Systems, Inc., now known as Wang Federal). [Ref.
20] The SCOMP received a Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC) Al
rating after evaluation (see Chapter II, section G) by the National Computer Security
Center (NCSC) in 1984.
The SCOMP was based on the Distributed Processing System Level 6 (DPS6)
hardware. The DPS6 was a microcomputer developed by Honeywell. Following the
SCOMP development, the STOP 3.1 was developed on the DPS6-Plus hardware to form
the XTS-200. "The DPS6-Plus was a version ofthe DPS6 that ran a secure system" [Ref.
20]. The STOP 3.1 incorporated complete file system support within the TCB and more
advanced methods of software engineering than used for the SCOMP development. The
XTS-300 introduced the Intel processor and made corresponding function updates. These
function updates included moving the I/O processes from the Trusted (or TCB) Systems
Services (TSS) domain (Ring 1) to the Security Kernel (Ring 0), to move such
functionality to the system's lowest possible architectural layer. The ring structure utilized
by the XTS-300 will be discussed in this chapter.
A significant limitation to the XTS-300 is its single processor capability as
compared to the XTS-200's multi-processor. [Ref. 14, p. 6] However there is now a
configuration for the XTS-300 which includes an upgrade to dual Pentium processors.
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The XTS-300 achieved a TCSEC Class B3 rating based after an evaluation (see
Chapter II, section G) by the NCSC. To achieve a Division B rating or higher, the TCB
must preserve the integrity of sensitivity labels and ensure their use in the enforcement of
mandatory access control rules. The sensitivity labels must be attached to all major data
structures. Additionally, the security model on which the TCB is based and the
specification for the TCB must be provided by the developer. [Ref. 12, p. 91]
Specifically for the Class B3 rating, the TCB must demonstrate that it meets the
basic requirements of a reference monitor. Those requirements include that the TCB must
mediate all accesses of objects by subjects, be tamperproof, and be small enough to
subjected to analysis and tests. The last requirement encourages the developer to
eliminate the inclusion of code in the TCB that is not essential for security policy
enforcement. Additionally these design constraints help to minimize system complexity.
There are support functions provided for a security administrator, audit mechanisms that
must signal security relevant events, and system recover procedures which are required.
The system must be highly resistant to penetration. [Ref. 12, p. 94]
B. DESIGN AND ARCHITECTURE
"The XTS-300 is a 32-bit, demand-paging, time sharing, single processor system"
Ref. 14, p. 7]. It uses the Intel 486 or the Pentium chip(s) as its processor(s). The basic
configuration comes with 32 MB ofRAM upgradable to 4 GB. The remainder of the
hardware includes readily available COTS products (e.g. color monitor, CD-ROM, hard
drive, etc.). The terminals, communications hardware, controllers, and mass storage have
been evaluated to meet the B3 requirements for the XTS-300.
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The Intel processor incorporates a ring architecture to achieve the separation of
information system by physically isolating portions of system processes from tampering.
There are 4 separate isolated rings, or domains in the architecture, known as privilege
levels (PL0-PL3). PL3 is the least privileged and PLO the most. The architecture is
depicted in Figure 8. The untrusted and trusted processes utilize different ring


















TRUSTED SYSTEM SERVICES (TSS)
SECURITY KERNEL
Figure 8 XTS-300 Ring Architecture From Ref. 124]
1. RingO
The innermost ring, PLO or Ring 0, is the most privileged ring and is where the
Security Kernel software resides. The Security Kernel is where the Reference Monitor
exists and where all MAC mechanisms are implemented. "Small and well-structured to
enable complete security evaluation, testing, and verification, the Kernel provides basic
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operating system services such as resource management, process scheduling, interrupt and
trap handling, auditing, and enforcement of mandatory security and discretionary access
policies for process and device objects." [Ref. 24]
The Kernel mediates all accesses to objects. Objects include processes, segments
(disk addresses) and devices. Therefore, considering that the most common subjects are
represented as processes, the different types of accesses include process-to-process,
process-to-segment, and process-to-device. As processes request access to objects, the
Kernel performs the necessary access control checks. After the initial access is authorized,
the hardware mediates all future accesses.
The Kernel also mediates the creation of all processes. The Kernel creates the
address space for the process and places. Within that address space, there are fields that
are only accessible by the Kernel. Those fields are used for global management of security
and the system.
2. Ring 1
Ring 1 is where the Trusted System Service (TSS) software executes. The TSS is
also known as TCB System Service within Reference [14]. The TSS provides those
trusted system services required by both the trusted and untrusted processes. Similar to
the Kernel implementation, the TSS has segments within each process's address space,
where all information regarding access to and by the TSS is stored.
The services provided by the TSS are network services, input/output
management, file system management, and enforcement of discretionary access policy for
file system objects and segments (i.e. services not provided by the Security Kernel). The
TSS also manages the creation and loading of all programs, both trusted and unstressed,
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via calls to the Security Kernel as necessary. The Security Kernel controls the services
provided by the TSS. All operations, TSS or other XTS operations, utilize MAC through
the Security Kernel. [Refs. 14 and 24]
3. Ring 2
Two different software components operate within Ring 2. The first software
component, known as the Trusted Software, includes trusted processes that perform
security relevant functions and provide the interfaces for the user to execute trusted
commands in a trusted environment. The second, is the Commodity Application System
Services (CASS). The CASS is the untrusted UNIX environment interface for user
written or ported applications to run on. These user applications actually reside in Ring 3
.
A process is only allowed to run in one of these two software components. There is no
transfer between untrusted and trusted environments.
Trusted Software is any process that is performing security policy enforcement or
related services. The user initiates the request to enter a trusted environment by striking
the Secure Attention Key (SAK) (i.e. Alt+SysRq keys) which signals the Kernel which in
turn invokes the Secure Server. The Secure Server checks whether the terminal is logged
in to the server. If the terminal is not logged in, the Secure Server invokes the login
function. If the terminal is logged in and executing a trusted process, the process
terminates itself and the user is prompted for a trusted command. If untrusted processes
are being executed, the Secure Server displays the current session level (sensitivity and
integrity levels) and prompts the user for a trusted command. If the Secure Server
recognizes the command entered by the user, on the trusted command list, then it is
executed either through the Secure Server or as an operator command. Operator
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commands (i.e. audit, dump, etc.) are special commands reserved for users with the
integrity of operator or higher (see section 6). A user operating at an operator integrity
level is not allowed to leave the secure environment to process untrusted commands.
The CASS also executes within Ring 2. The purpose of the CASS is to make the
secure environment transparent to application software operating in Ring 3 and to provide
I/O and operating system services to the applications. CASS only executes as part of
unstressed processes. CASS is notpart ofthe TCB.
With no privileges to violate security policy, CASS provides an
implementation of the UNIX System V Interface Definition (SVTD),
enabling easy UNIX application porting or development on the XTS-300.
Only a very few SVTD services that violate the NSA-defined security policy
have been replaced by a CASS equivalent, or eliminated. In addition, in
STOP 4.3, CASS includes a gate (not part of the TCB) that enables Ring 3
processes to spawn Ring 2 processes, a capability required by some
commodity MLS applications. [Ref. 24]
To enter an untrusted environment (i.e. a CASS process) from the trusted
environment, the user executes the run command. The integrity level of the user must be
at 0-3 to execute the command. To change the session level, the user enters the si
command and then enters a sensitivity level (0-16) and an integrity level (0-8). These
levels are specifically addressed in section 6 of this chapter. [Ref. 31, pp. 34, 38]
4. Ring 3
Untrusted user-developed (or ported) processes are executed in Ring 3. Any
runtime libraries that are required by the applications must also be located in Ring 3. If
services are required from inner rings, they are executed through the CASS or specific
interfaces defined within the processes virtual address space header. [Ref. 14]
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5. TCB Protection Mechanisms
"The most important services provided by the TCB are its protection
mechanisms." [Ref. 14, p. 103] The first service provided by the evaluated STOP 4.1 is
the enforcement of the security policy which consists of a MAC policy and a DAC policy.
The rest of the pertinent mechanisms consist of Identification and Authentication, Audit,
Object Reuse and the category of "Additional Supporting Protection Mechanisms." [Ref.
14]
6. MAC
The MAC policy is based on a combination of the Bell and LaPadula model for
sensitivity and the Biba model for integrity [Ref. 14, p. 107]. All subjects have an
associated MAC label that consists of sensitivity labels and integrity labels of the subject's
current access levels. The Kernel enforces the policy that a subject's MAC label must
always be dominated by the user's clearance. Like subjects, all objects have sensitivity and
integrity labels appropriate to the sensitivity and integrity levels of the information
contained within the objects.
STOP 4.1 MAC labels contain the following information:
• Sensitivity label:
- Sensitivity level (16 hierarchical)
- Sensitivity categories (64 nonhierarchical)
• Integrity label:
- Integrity level (8 hierarchical). STOP 4. 1 has predefined
meanings for the integrity levels, as follows:
0-3 User Integrity
4 Operating System Services (OSS) Integrity (i.e.,





- Integrity categories (16 nonhierarchical) [Ref. 14, p. 106]]
Labels are compared between subjects and objects, with respect to dominance, as
described in Chapter II. The subject must dominate the object in the sensitivity labels and
the opposite is true for integrity labels. To gain access for reading or executing an object
the subject must meet both the Simple Security Policy and the Simple Integrity Policy.
The subject must meet both Security * property and Integrity * property to gain access to
write to an object.
Those polices according to References [14] and [24] are:
Simple Security - A subject may read or execute an object only if the
security level of the subject dominates (is greater than or equal to) that of
the object.
Simple Integrity - A subject may read or execute an object only if the
integrity level of the object dominates that of the subject.
Security * property - A subject may write an object only if the security
level of the object dominates that of the subject.
Integrity * property - A subject may write an object only if the integrity
level of the subject dominates that of the object (exception: a process may
write up to another).
The XTS-300's implementation of policies for writing is even more restrictive than
stated above. The subject and the object to be written to must have the same integrity and
security labels before the Kernel will grant access.
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7. DAC
The DAC policy in the evaluated STOP 4. 1 enforces access to an object by a
subject according to owner or group relationship to the object. Access to objects are
determined by the list of subjects allowed to access those objects or by subjects who are
members of a group that is authorized access to the object. The TCB enforces the
following discretionary access rule:
Access modes - A subject may access an object in only those mode(s)
granted by the owner of the object. Each object shall be assigned
permissions (read, write, execute) for the owner of the object, for the
members of the owner's group for other specifically identified groups, and
for all others. [Ref. 24]
As previously stated, the labels used for MAC enforcement consist of sensitivity
and integrity levels and categories.
DAC labels contain the following information:
- object's owner and group identifiers;
- read, write, execute permissions for owner, for members of groups to
which owner belongs, and for all other users;
- up to six user and group identifiers and their permissions (read, write,
execute);
- object's subtype (subtypes are finer gradations of protection; there may
be one or more subtypes per "parent" type).
The following rules are enforced by the TCB:
- If subject owns object, use specified owner permissions; if not
- If entry exists for subject in Access Control List (ACL), use ACL
permissions; if not
- If subject's current group is the same object's owner's group, use
specified group permissions; if not
- If there is an entry for group in ACL, use group permissions; if not
- If subject has no other specific permissions, use specified "other"
("world") permissions. [Ref. 24]
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The process of controlling access to an object includes examining the ACL to
determine if the subject requesting access is on an authorized user or group list. If the
subject is located on such a list, then the permissions are examined to determine if the
requested mode is allowed for the subject. The modes are the standard read, write, and
execute. [Ref 14, pp. 108, 109]
8. Identification and Authentication
"STOP 4. 1 requires all users to identify and authenticate themselves before they
are allowed to access system resources"[Ref. 14, p. 118]. Section 3 discussed how to
enter the trusted environment with the SAK. Once in the trusted environment from a
terminal that is not logged in to the secure server, the user is prompted for a user name
and then a password. The password is encrypted and compared to the user's encrypted
password in the User Access Authentication database. The User Access Authentication
database has the label of maximum integrity and maximum sensitivity. Therefore, the
database is only accessible by someone with administrator privileges (i.e. integrity level 8,
sensitivity level 16).
The user has a preset amount of allowed attempts to login. After the preset
amount (i.e. default of 5) is attempted, the terminal is locked by the system ignoring the
SAK. The terminal remains locked until a set time (i.e. default 60-sec) or less if the
system administrator resets the terminal.
The passwords also have associated expiration and password lifetime dates. If the
expiration date is reached then the user is notified to change their password. If the
password lifetime date is reached, the password is made invalid and the user is locked out
until the system administrator gives the user a new password. The only exception allowed
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is the system administrator's ability to perform a console login to update the password.
[Ref. 14, pp. 118-119]
9. Audit
The audit services are conducted by a trusted file daemon, the Kernel Audit
Process, and by a set of routines in the Kernel known as the Audit Functions. The
services are part of the STOP and record all security-relevant events within the system.
The Audit Functions may be called by the Kernel, Trusted System Services, or
Trusted Software when an event occurs that warrants recording. The Audit Functions
build individual frames with the recorded information and places the frames on an audit
queue. The Kernel Audit Process then takes the frames and writes them to disk segments
where trusted file system daemon adds the segments to the audit directory.
There are 78 events between the Kernel, TSS, and Trusted Software that can
trigger an audit event. Since the Kernel is the only ring that can process audits, if it gets
over loaded by a large amount of such events the Kernel will prevent additional processes
from entering until the audit events are handled. In other words, audits can become a
source of system slow down. To help alleviate some of these possible burdens, the system
administrator can add and remove any number of events. Additionally, the system
administrator can also specify a minimum MAC label at which object creation, deletion,
and access will be recorded. [Ref. 14, pp. 121-124]
C. DOD APPLICATION OF THE XTS ARCHITECTURE
1. INTRODUCTION
"From 1992 through 1994, the DoD by the MLS Program surveyed the unified
commands and some of their subordinate units to identify operational requirements for
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MLS in the DoD " [Ref. 22, p.l] The DoD MLS Program subsequently developed
engineering plans in order to satisfy the requirements identified.
The following commands were included in the survey: U.S. Atlantic Command,
U.S. Central Command, U.S. European Command, U.S. Pacific Command, U.S. Southern
Command, U.S. Special Operations Command, U.S. Space Command, U.S. Strategic
Command, and U.S. Atlantic Command. [Ref. 22, p. 1] These commands require data
security support in a plethora of operational and support roles including command and
control, intelligence, planning, modeling, logistics, force management, and administration.
Various computer architectures were also identified, which encompass stand alone,
distributed, heterogeneous, and networked client and server systems. Additionally, all of
the commands surveyed, interoperated electronically with other external commands. [Ref.
22]
Significant differences exist, among and within the commands surveyed, between
the equipment employed and the services required. There are varying levels of classified
data, a range of compartments processed, personnel with various clearances, and systems
authorized to operate at different classification levels. MLS systems are necessary to
satisfy data protection and information flow requirements internal and external to these
commands.
2. Automated Guard
Since requirements indicate that interoperability among computer systems
operating at different security levels is necessary, an interface (or multiple interfaces)
between these systems becomes essential. Past interface techniques included manual
retyping of data to be shared, or transferred between systems via magnetic media. These
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manual techniques do not satisfy most of today's information flow requirements.
Automated techniques, which have become irreplaceable, are necessary to satisfy
information flow requirements.
An automated, MLS guard can be used to control information flow across systems
with various security boundaries. This guard could be used to review data, originating
from a computer system operating at a specific security level, and determine if the transfer
of that data to a system operating at a different security level should be allowed.
The guard would be enforcing the classification and releasability rules. That means
that the guard would be responsible for protecting the data in accordance with its security
level, and determining if the requested destination is authorized to receive that data. In
order to accomplish such tasks, the guard would require the automation of classification
and releasability rules. Personnel administering and operating such a device would
require, at a minimum, security clearances commensurate with the highest system
controlled by the guard.
The XTS-300 architecture could be used as automated, bi-directional filters to
transfer the data as requested and authorized, and provide acknowledgments for such data
transfer. Specifically, the XTS-300 can include the following functionality: automated
review of data flow requests and receipt acknowledgments from a high-side system to a
low-side system; the normally acceptable low-side system to a high-side system data flow
as well as receipt acknowledgments in the same direction (see Figure 9). [Ref 22, p. 1 1]
The automated guard receives requests from the servers (high or low) and determines, in
accordance with the releasability policy, if that user is authorized to make such a request.
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Figure 9 Automated Guard Architecture From Ref. [22, p. 11]
A version of such a design is developed through the Defense Information Systems
Agency (DISA) MLS Program Office. Although the guard's review of the data flow
request is automated, manual review by an operator is required in the cases where the
guard can not adjudicate the request. The administrative configuration tools included with
the guard allow for the filtering techniques to be tailored to reflect organizational
requirements (e.g. changes in classification rules).
3. Release Control Guard
In the scenario where single directional data flow is required, modifications to the
previous design (i.e. the automated, bi-directional guard) are possible. Single directional
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data flow is specifically desirable when considering the operational requirement to provide
releasable data to other organizations or countries.
Such a scenario may involve an organization operating at a higher security level
than a foreign counterpart. Here we may have a situation where, as in the automated bi-
directional guard, the high-side has data that requires automated review and release to the
low-side. However, there may be no need or identified future requirement for low-to-high
flow of data. In fact, explicit denial of low-to-high data flow may be expressly required.
Figure 10 presents the data flow design approach of an employment of the XTS-300 to
provide the release control guard capabilities described. As is typical with the use of a
MLS system as a guard, scenarios not modeled or situations involving unresolvable errors













Figure 10 Release Control Guard Architecture From Ref. [22, p.12]
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4. Standard Mail Guard
Electronic mail (email) is a common requirement of all DoD commands. There
exists extensive connectivity between and within commands involved in the exchange of
unclassified email. However, such connectivity is lacking between classified and
unclassified networks.
Figure 1 1 is an architecture to satisfy requirements originating from users, on
networks operating at different classification levels. Specifically, the architecture attempts
to satisfy existing requirements to provide unclassified email service between users of
secret LANs and users of unclassified LANs. This Standard Mail Guard (SMG) is being
developed by the NSA MISSI program using the MISSI Secure Network Server (SNS).
This SNS is designed to serve as a guard between the differing classified networks. [Ref.
22, p. 13]
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Figure 11 Standard Mail Guard Architecture From Ref. [22, p. 13]
Although there are automated checks (e.g. filters, dirty word checkers) hosted by
the guard, the responsibility of data review resides primarily with the user. The user, on
the classified network, is expected to review the email message to verify that classified
data is not present prior to the transmission to an unclassified system. The guard will then
apply its automated checking features prior to delivery.
The NSA is using the XTS architecture as the trusted component of the SNS. The
SNS is focused on achieving a TCSEC rating of Class B3 or higher. Through the
employment of the SNS, the SMG can also be used to reduce the risk and success of
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penetration attempts (e.g. unauthorized access), originating from the unclassified network,
targeting the secret network.
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IV. THE HIGH ASSURANCE, MULTILEVEL SECURE MAIL
SERVER (HAMMS)
A. INTRODUCTION
The purpose ofHAMMS is to provide a multilevel mail service in a high assurance
environment. The concept of the mail service is to allow the user to view label-based mail
existing at the user's current session level and all dominated levels supported by the high
assurance system. The viewing of mail at dominated levels should occur without requiring
the user to change session levels.
The original mail application implementation for the XTS-300 required the user to
change session levels to view mail at dominated levels. A freeware mail application was
installed and modified to allow execution in the XTS-300 environment to provide a more
functional user interface for common mail services. Mail service software was developed
to manipulate user mail spools and mail folders to allow users to view mail at levels
dominated by their current session level.
This chapter will describe the design implementation of the HAMMS research
which includes the XTS-300 hardware architecture connected via a Local Area Network
(LAN) using Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) , to two desktop
personal computers (80486 architecture). The XTS-300 operates with the operating
system STOP version 4.3, mail application adaptations, and mail service software. Each of
the workstations operate with the Microsoft - Disk Operating System (MS-DOS) version




The XTS-300 accomplishes data separation through a combination of high
assurance hardware and software. The hardware architecture is described in Chapter III
section B. The XTS-300 hardware was also used to provide the ability to maintain
network connectivity, sufficient processing and memory capability, and to provide security
policy enforcement (in conjunction with STOP) to support the HAMMS development.
Other than an evaluated Ethernet card, no XTS-300 hardware was added or modified to
support the HAMMS research and design implementation.
2. Workstations
The HAMMS workstation hardware was also required to be capable of
maintaining network connectivity and providing sufficient processing and memory
capability to support executing software. The hardware used to test the network
connection to the XTS-300 high assurance base included two 33 MHz, 80486
workstations each configured with: 8 MB RAM, a 124 MB hard drive, a 1.44 MB floppy
drive, an Ethernet card, and a VGA monitor. The workstations were connected to the
XTS-300 via serial and TCP/IP connections.
Additional hardware related to this research includes the Media Encryption Board
(MEB). Appendix C describes this MEB hardware, I/O settings, installation, and
initialization procedures. Research related to this hardware was conducted to determine




The software employed, adapted, or developed to support the HAMMS design
within the XTS-300 includes the operating system STOP 4.3, elm (an interactive screen-
oriented mail application that superseded mail and mailx), and the mail service software
developed to manipulate user mail spools and deposit user mail into the respective user's
mail folders.
In conjunction with the XTS-300's hardware, its software provides security policy
enforcement with respect to both hierarchical (e.g. classifications), and non hierarchical
(e.g. compartments) labeled data. Chapter III section B describes the XTS-300's software
architecture.
Elm, was ported to the XTS to aid the development and the testing ofHAMMS.
Section D2 of this chapter discusses the associated adaptation issues and required
modifications to allow the compilation and execution of elm in the XTS-300 environment.
Prior to the adaptation of elm, the only mail applications available on the XTS-300 were
UNIX-like command line mail and mailx. These applications did not provide an adaptable
user environment that allowed for the reading of mail existing at levels dominated by the
user's current session level and mail folder manipulation was cumbersome.
To view mail at dominated session levels, the development of mail handling
software was required to support HAMMS. Section D3 of this chapter describes the
development ofHAMMS software that allows dominated levels of mail to be viewed by
the email application, elm, installed and adapted for the XTS-300.
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2. Workstations
Tested workstation software includes DOS 6.0, Win 3.11 for Workgroups,
Trumpet Winsock 2.1 revision f , Trumpet Winsock TCP/IP with Windows for
Workgroups (i.e. communications compatibility utility), X-Win version 2.8.8, Win 3.11
Terminal application.
The initial use of Trumpet Winsock 2.1 with adaptation of the Trumpet Winsock
TCP/IP utility introduced socket connection stack errors (i.e. overflows) in the X-Win
utility. To alleviate these communication problems, analysis was conducted with X-Win
technical personnel which revealed incompatibilities between the X-Win application and
the Trumpet Winsock TCP/IP utility. The technical representatives recommended using
the Microsoft TCP/IP protocol for Win 3.11, available as freeware from the Microsoft
homepage. This protocol alleviated all socket stack errors.
The tested XTS-300 software did not provide remote Telnet connectivity. There
were no Telnet daemons executing on the XTS-300 to allow remote session login,
subsequent sessions, and associated operations. To initiate a workstation session
capability for design development and testing, the Windows 3.11 terminal application was
utilized via a serial connection to the XTS-300. To establish the actual connection, the
user must execute the terminal application and then open the corresponding connection
configuration file (i.e. XTS-300.trm). Once the specific terminal connection was
established, the user could initiate the login process.
Logging in from the workstation is accomplished by invoking the Secure Attention
Key (SAK) (i.e. Ctrl + Pause keys) at the workstation. This action is used to invoke
trusted commands. After initially entering the SAK, the user is prompted for userid and
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password information that is verified through the high assurance identification and
authentication services provided by the XTS-300. Subsequent to successful login, the
XTS-300 changes the user environment from the trusted command environment to the
untrusted UNIX-like command line environment.
The Windows 3.11 TCP/IP utility was used at the workstation to establish a
network connection with the XTS-300. X-Win was installed to provide a windowed user
interface for the established network session. Due to the lack of a Telnet capability on the
XTS-300, the user workstation session was initiated by the terminal application. After the
user had established a session on the XTS-300 via the terminal application, additional
Xwindows applications could be displayed on the workstation by indicating the application
(e.g. Xterm, Xedit) desired and the address for that display. An example ofhow to invoke
this capability is as follows:
holmes:/usr2/userid» xterm -display 131.120.10.95:0.0
(<prompt» <application><-optionfor system console displayxdisplay
address:0.0>)
Although there are several Xwindows applications (e.g. Xterm, Xedit) that are
currently available on the XTS-300, the X-Win application used at the workstation
restricts the simultaneous execution and display to two Xwindows applications or
windows. The Xedit application, used for development, requires two Xwindows for its
operations, therefore no others Xwindows could be executed simultaneously with Xedit.
Upon execution and configuration of terminal and X-Win applications, a user at the
workstation would have established a session with the XTS-300 and be provided X-Win
applications in a windowed environment.
57
D. MAIL SERVER DEVELOPMENT
1. Design Decisions
The original XTS-300 mail functionality used deflection directories to separate the
mail between session levels. The XTS mail implementation supports the creation of a
deflection directory for each session level. Each ofthese deflection directories is created
with the same name. Additionally, the individual mail deflection directories contain files
with users' names as the file names (e.g. /usr/mail/userid) (see Figure 12). The file within
the session-level-specific deflection directory is the mail spool for the current session level.
When a user is logged into the XTS-300, only the file in the deflection directory at the
current session level is visible to the user environment as the mail spool. Therefore, there
is no labeling of individual mail messages within the mail files implemented by the XTS-
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visible at any level
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Figure 12 Deflection Directory Structure
Due to the deflection directory structure on the XTS-300 and the limitations of the
implemented mail applications, there were two design approaches considered for the
HAMMS development. The first approach focused on the server side of the mail
application. The second approach concentrated on the mail folders used by the mail
application to store mail.
a. Design Approach Number One
The mail applications refer to the environment for the mail spool location.
That location refers to the storage point (i.e. mail spool) of new mail for users. This
environment location, or variable, can be redirected to designated files other than the mail
spool.
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A untrusted subject could be developed to consolidate a user's mail spools
from dominated deflection directories into a single multilevel mail spool to provide a read-
down capability. The subject would be initiated upon user login to read mail from each of
the dominated levels, mark the mail with advisory labels corresponding to the originating
session level, and write all mail to a single object at the user's current session level.
The consolidated mail file would be read by the mail application at the
current session level. If a mail message to be deleted or marked as read has a label
equivalent to the current session level, then the message would be directly modified







































Figure 13 Read Approach, Design Number One
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There were two subordinate design approaches discussed addressing the
situation of a mail message that is to be deleted or marked as read which has a label
strictly dominated by the current session level. The first approach to solve this scenario
would require a trusted subject to write-down to the mail file in the dominated deflection
directory to delete the mail message or mark it as read (see Figure 14).
Example of Trusted Subject Performing Write-Down











Figure 14 Trusted Subject Number One
The second approach would require the creation of a table at each level
containing mail to be updated. The table would be developed through a write-down by a
trusted subject originating from the level from which that message had been read. This
table would reflect the read or delete status of mail messages in that session level's mail
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spool which would be acted upon the next time the user logged in at that session level (see
Figure 15).
Example of Trusted Subject Performing Write-Down




















Figure 15 Trusted Subject Number Two
b. Design Approach Number Two
Design approach two concentrated on moving users' mail from their mail
spool to user-specific mailboxes to be referenced by the mail application. HAMMS was
designed to move the mail from the user's mail spool to the user's mailboxes. HAMMS
delivered the mail to mailboxes (i.e. labeled files), in the user's local directory, labeled with
session level labels commensurate to the corresponding deflection directory. This
approach provides the user the ability to view, with an adapted mail application, the
mailboxes that were dominated by the user's session level. The HAMMS mail-moving
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process could be set up as a single, multilevel trusted process that is executed at login or
untrusted processes that operate as system daemons.
The trusted process would be executing in support of the user, traversing
deflection directories, checking the associated mail spools within the various deflection
directories for new mail and then transferring the messages to the mail boxes in the users
local directory (see Figure 16). Another possibility would be for a trusted process to
signal untrusted processes at the different session levels to do the same. Each of these
options involves the addition of trusted code to the XTS-300 (see Figure 17).
Trusted Subject Traversing Mail Spools and











































Figure 16 Trusted Subject Number Three
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Trusted Subject Signaling Untrusted Subjects to Transfer


















































Figure 17 Trusted Subject Number Four
The approach selected for the development ofHAMMS involves the use of
untrusted processes only. In this approach, the untrusted process is duplicated at each
session level, is modified to reflect the session level labeling (i.e. UNCLASSIFIED,
CONFIDENTIAL, and SECRET mailbox object names), and operates as a system
daemon to check all users' mail spools. The untrusted process transfers the new mail to
the users' mailboxes within each user's local directory. Mail, from all levels dominated by
the user's current session level, is then available to be viewed by the user through a mail












































Figure 18 HAMMS Design
The mail application can operate (i.e. read and write mail) on a mailbox at
the same level as the user's current session level. However, regardless of design approach
selected, the mail application's functionality is restricted due to implemented security
properties. Specifically, due to * property, or confinement property, relating to secrecy
(no-write-down), the mail from strictly dominated levels cannot be marked as viewed or
deleted without the introduction of additional trusted processes. Each mail application
analyzed (i.e. Netscape, Eudora, mail, mailx) employs unique marking protocols for
messages that have been read. Therefore, significant future research is required to
determine the feasibility of creating a dynamic (i.e. recognizes and adapts to mail
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application identified) trusted subject that could provide the interface to the mail
application to perform the write-down and properly mark the messages according to the
application's protocol.
2. Adaptation of Applications
There were several attempts to adapt UNIX based applications to the XTS-300
environment to support this research. After copying the required files to the XTS-300
host, unique software switches were required to extract the required files. Specifically, tar
-xvfo was required when extracting the compacted files. Due to the XTS-300 MAC and
DAC security restrictions, and incompatibilities between host libraries and application
source code, compilation frequently required changes to the Makefiles and to the
application source code itself.
Elm version 2.4, obtained as freeware, was the mail application installed and
configured to support the mail interface in the development ofHAMMS. The elm
configuration application queries the user for a plethora of system capability and user
preference information. This configuration application also checks the system for
confirmation of the system capability data. After entering and confirming this data, the
information is stored in the file configure. h. Use of the make
-fMakefile command
sequence then attempts to compile the program. Part of the compilation process included
executing the shell files (*.sh) in the main and sub-directories of the application source
directory. The shell files utilized the configuration information in configure.h and placed
that information in the Makefiles for the respective directories. A problem encountered
was that the shell files in the sub-directories would not execute automatically. Therefore,
the shell files in the sub-directories had to be executed individually. Upon successful
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execution of all shell files, make -/Makefile could be executed in the sub-directories and
subsequently in the application source directory.
When compiling with the XTS-300 libraries, conflicts with non-existent or
outdated commands may occur. The first conflict that occurred was with the pattern.c
file. A compilation error was generated because this file's "return" value was a NULL but
the compiler expected an integer value. The second conflict was that elm's function call
for itoa called for only two integer arguments but the definition in the XTS-300 header
file, stdlib.h, required two integers and a character pointer (i.e. int, char *, int).
The following listing indicates the differences between the original mail application
C files and the required modifications developed to overcome the conflicts:













































< original char *itoa(i, twodigit)
> modified char *itoa(i,dummy, twodigit)
213a214
> modified char *dummy;
The above changes allowed the elm application to compile and link in the XTS-
300 environment. When elm was executed it would successfully execute until quit was
initiated by the user. Initiation of quit generated an access permissions error. Research
revealed that elm would change, through a chown (change owner) command call, the file
user identification. Specifically, a file's userid, used by elm, was first changed to -1 and
then elm attempted to change ownership back to the actual userid that was executing elm.
Simultaneously, the groupid was changed -1 . The XTS-300 allows chown to be executed
by only the owner of the file. When the userid was changed to -1, the XTS-300 would not
allow the elm process to change ownership back to the original userid. The following
listing details the differences between the original elm utility file and the file developed to
overcome the conflict:















> * int status;
>*










These changes allowed elm to compile and execute within the user's current
session level. If mail at dominated levels has been moved, by HAMMS untrusted subjects,
from the mail spools to the user's mailboxes at the respective levels, then elm allows that
mail to be viewed without any of the previously described ownership conflicts.
Additional research indicated that compiling desired research tools (e.g. nedit, axe)
on the XTS-300 created multiple errors in linking and unresolved errors due to missing
libraries and include files. Installing additional applications for future research will require
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modifications similar to those previously described. Updated libraries may also be
required.
3. Mail Daemon Development
As previously discussed, the design approach selected to implement HAMMS
included using untrusted code operating as session level mail daemons. To accomplish
this design, the first function created was the concat function which accepts two files as
input parameters, copies the information from the first file (i.e. the mail spool) to the end
of the second file (i.e. the user's session level specific mailbox). The first file is reopened
for a write access which truncates that file and prepares the file to receive new incoming
mail and effectively overwrite the mail that has already been received and copied.
The/open function allows a file to be opened as read only, write only, or append.
The files are first opened with read (i.e. the mail spool) and append (i.e. the user's session
level specific mailbox) options. The messages from the mail spool file are read using the
/gets command and then written to the mailbox file using the/puts command. The files are
then closed to prepare for future file manipulations. To effectively delete the information
in the mail spool file, after it had been copied, the file was reopened with the write option
which truncates that file. Synchronization problems during simultaneous access requests
of the files were not identified during development. Additional analysis should be
conducted to identify potential synchronization problems between elm and HAMMS for
either sending or receiving mail.
The second function, findlJserMail, opens the mail spool directory and then
sequences through the directory checking the size of each file. If the file size is greater
than zero, then the concat function is called to copy the information in the user's mail
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spool file to the mailbox file in the user's local directory. Specific header files from the
stop directory had to be included (i.e. stop/stdtyp.h) to create these functions. To include
these files in the compilation of the object files, the -oss attribute had to be included in the
compilation sequence. One function that is defined in the header files is the
open with status function which opened the input file and returned the status of that file.
This function was used initially to try to check the size of the files as they were referenced
via the readdir function. To allow the open with status function to be visible in the
linking process, the -oss attribute had to be included in the compilation of the HAMMS
executable. This attribute changed the library that was included in linking from libc.a to
libcass.a. However, use of this attribute had the undesirable effect of excluding two
important system functions: chdir (change directory) and getcwd (get current working
directory). To alleviate this problem, openwithstatus was eliminated and the stat
function was used instead. This resulted in two subsequent side effects. First , the -oss
attribute was no longer required for linking, but remained necessary for compiling the
object files. Second, the stat function successfully determined the size of the file without
requiring the opening and closing of that file.
ThefindUserMaiI function is called by main via an infinite loop to allow for
daemon initiation. To allow for the reading and writing of the user mail spools, HAMMS
must be assigned the group of mail which is the same group assignment for the mail
spools. To allow writing to the mailboxes in the users' mail directories, the world
permissions on the users' root directories must be read and execute. Additionally, the
group on the Mail directory must be set to mail with the permissions of read, write, and
execute. Each mailbox within the Mail directory must also have the same group
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designation and permissions. Other than previously indicated, the user can establish DAC
permissions for his root directory as desired. However, the user should avoid granting
write permissions to the world to avoid other users from modifying files.
The mail spool, the users' local mail directory, and mail files may be redefined (i.e.
change the actual file name to reflect changes in host system) within the util.h file. For
example, Mefme MAIL FOLDER "/Mail/UNCLASSIFIED" can be changed to Mefine
MAILFOLDER "/Mail/SECRET" and the resulting util.h file can be stored at the session
level handling Secret mail. Therefore, the object file produced from the compilation and
linking of utile can be reused without modifications.
The Makefile, main.c, util.h, and utile files are as follows:
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ill II II ft II II II II II II II IIII II It II If II II If II II II II II II II II It it It If ft If If II II till If II
# File: Makefile
# Name: LT James P. Downey, LT Dion A. Robb
#
# Operating Environment: XTS-300, STOP 4.3
# Compiler: MetaWare High C
#
# Description: Makefile for HAMMS. Contains -oss attribute for the Stop 4.3
# header files.
HttHIUtHHHHHiMitHII II II II IIMtJHHHHWittHHt-HrTTTTTTTtTTTTTttTTTTTTTTTTTTT Tt tl trtt TT TTTTTTTTlT ft TT ft TTTTTTTTTT
HAMMS: main.o util.o
cc -o HAMMS main.o util.o
main.o : main.c
cc -oss -c main.c utile
util.o : utile
cc -oss -c util.c




* Name: LT James P. Downey, LT Dion A. Robb
*
* Operating Environment: XTS-300, STOP 4.3
*
*
* Description: Calls findUserMail declared in util.h continuously to initiate mail daemon




















* Name: LT James P. Downey, LT Dion A. Robb
*
* Operating Environment: XTS-300, STOP 4.3
* Compiler: MetaWare High C
*
* Description: This file includes definitions of parameters and locations of
* parameters and functions required for the compilation and use of utile
*












/Beginning of path to user's directory*/
#define MAIL_PATH 7usr2/"
/*Path and file for user's Unclassified mail*/
#define MAIL_FOLDER "/Mail/UNCLASSIFIED"
/*Directory of user mail spools*/
#define MAIL_SPOOL 7usr/mail"
/*Maximum width for line of text*/
#define LINESIZE (256)







* Name: LT James P. Downey, LT Dion A. Robb
*
* Operating Environment: XTS-300, STOP 4.3
* Compiler: MetaWare High C
* Description: Contains functions to sequence through a directory
* and concatenate all files with size greater than zero with a
* user's mailbox file with in the user's directory
*
* Input: Defined path and file variables in util.h
*






* Return Type: void
* Parameter: fileA - input file to be read from and truncated
* fileB - file to be written to
* Purpose: To copy info from fileA to fileB and clear fileA
***********************************************************************/
void concat(fileA,fileB)
const char *fileA, *fileB;
{
/* tempA has mail spool data, tempB receives that data for user's mailbox*/
FILE *tempA,*tempB;
/* line is used to store mail spool data as it is copied line by line*/
char line[LINESIZE];
/* tempA is opened for reading*/
if ((tempA = fopen(fileA, "r"))= NULL)
perror("cannot open fileA");
/* tempB is opened is opened for appending*/
if ((tempB = fopen(fileB, "a+"))= NULL)
perror("cannot open fileB");













* Return Type: void
* Parameter: none
* Purpose: cycle through directory designated by MAIL_SPOOL and concatenate any
* file greater then size zero with a file designated by MATLFOLDER in the user's




char curr_dir[PATH_MAX + 1]; /* PATH_MAX defined in limits.h as
*(NAME_MAX+1)*10
* NAME_MAX defined in limits.h as 23
currdir is the current directory*/
char dummy[PATH_MAX +1]; /* Temp var for storing directory name*/
char userMailPath[+ 1]; /* Path to user's mail*/
DIR *dirPtr; /* Directory structure pointer*/
int statStatus; /* Status of file*/
struct dirent *dp; /* Directory structure*/
statt bufarea; /* Status of buffer area*/




/* Step through the mail directory until the reaching the end*/
while ( (int) (dp = readdir(dirPtr)) > 0){
userMailPathfO] = '\0'; /*reset variable prior to receiving next users path*/
statStatus = stat(dp->d_name, &bufarea);
/check for good status skip
., .. and :saved*/
if ((statStatus= 0) && (strcmp(dp->d_name, ".") != 0)
&& (strcmp(dp->d_name, "..") != 0) && (strcmp(dp->d_name, M : saved") != 0)){
/*check for non-empty files, create path to file in owners directory and concat*/
if (bufarea.stsize > 0) {












V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
The development of a High Assurance, Multilevel Secure Mail Server (HAMMS)
is feasible. Existing systems within the DoD can be modified or adapted to satisfy the user
requirements of such a system. Appendix A provides the specification for the system
requirements. Designing a system to satisfy the requirements defined in Appendix A will
provide a system architecture that can be applied to meet future high assurance system
challenges.
The MLS system components and characteristics addressed in Chapter II must be
accurately understood in order to successfully develop MLS systems. A methodology,
such as the Systems Engineering Process, detailed in Appendix B, should be utilized to
define MLS system components and characteristics to satisfy performance, cost, and
schedule requirements of the system to be developed. Additionally, due to the extensive
evaluation process required ofMLS systems attempting to achieve a Class B2 or above
TCSEC rating (see Table 2 for requirements), the use of a rigorous and documented
methodology is absolutely essential for a successful system evaluation.
Existing DoD and commercial secure systems must be analyzed to determine
whether they can be adapted to satisfy the system requirements presented in Appendix A.
Although the research conducted and documented in Appendix D indicates that existing
systems may not provide COTS MLS solutions, the research helps to address issues that
arise when incorporating COTS workstations and operating systems in an MLS
environment. The areas of concern, identified within Appendix D, are partially solved by
the MEMS software and MEB hardware described in Appendix C. The MEMS can be
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applied to solve the boot process vulnerabilities identified in Appendix D. However,
significant additional research is required to provide the TCB NIC or similar capabilities
required by Appendix A.
After a comprehensive understanding of the high assurance base architecture
described in Chapter III, an accurate assessment of the system capabilities can be
developed. This information can be used to determine if trusted or untrusted software can
or should be developed to satisfy the system requirements. The advantage of developing
untrusted software on an evaluated system is that no additional TCB evaluation is
required. The development ofHAMMS focused on maximizing use of existing system
functionality and minimizing trusted software development.
Existing configurations of the XTS-300, described in Chapter III, indicate how the
system is used operationally. That configuration information can be used to identify
security and user interface issues which can be used to improve the security and
functionality of those current configurations as well as future high assurance system
development.
The proof of concept work, documented in Chapter IV, provides evidence that
implementation ofHAMMS is feasible. That research also indicates that such a system
can be implemented largely by using existing technology. Trusted software, as described
in Chapter IV to provide write-down functionality, may indeed be necessary to provide a
portion of the capabilities required. Significant research efforts are required to adapt
COTS mail applications to interface with HAMMS.
The development and implementation of high assurance systems must include
representatives of the user community. Although the security requirements of such
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systems must not be compromised, these systems must be useable. The user community,
as well as the test community, must be included as early as possible in the development of
the high assurance system. Analogous to the common error of many developers
attempting to add security to a system that has already been designed, useful user interface
tools cannot be easily added to a system that has failed to consider their incorporation in
the design process.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
The development ofHAMMS and associated research should be continued
through a rigorous systems engineering process, such as the one detailed in Appendix B.
Specifically, the continued use of performance requirements generation and the concept of
utilizing design teams (e.g. Integrated Product Team (IPT)) to make design decisions
should continue to be aggressively pursued. To continue the development process of
HAMMS and other high assurance servers, additional system and software design
documents should be developed in accordance with applicable military or commercial
standards (e.g. References 25 and 28). Continued documentation of the system design
process will provide a detailed system architecture, a document library, and a sound
configuration management source.
The capabilities of the upgrades planned for the XTS-300 should be analyzed to
determine the benefits from the modifications to current security and performance
capabilities (e.g. processing speed per client load). If those modifications are determined
to provide significant improvements to HAMMS and other future high assurance server
applications, then the upgraded system should be aggressively analyzed and employed.
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Continued research is required to follow planned MEMS development progress.
Specifically, incorporation ofMEMS with current and future operating systems (e.g.
Windows® 95 and Windows® NT) should be pursued with the sponsoring agency. Such
incorporation with these operating systems will provide a system compatible with current
operational workstations. Furthermore, analysis should be conducted to determine the
level of assurance provided by MEMS (e.g. is MEMS bypassable). Additionally, an
analysis of alternative cryptographic peripherals (CP) and media encryption software
should be conducted to determine the best alternative in support of high assurance server
development. Specifically, significant research is required to develop the TCB NIC or
similar capabilities to satisfy the requirements delineated in Appendix A. One requirement
that will require significant research and development is to insure that MEMS addresses
object reuse at the workstation (e.g. during logoff or session level change).
Research should be conducted to determine the version and compatibility of
C/C++ libraries, contained in the upgraded XTS-300, with common software development
tools (e.g. Xemacs, Sparcworks). If library compatibility is determined, then such
software development tools should be procured and installed on the upgraded XTS-300.
If incompatibility is determined then research should be pursued to incorporate
compatible libraries.
Software and hardware supporting continued research is required for the
workstations also. Specifically, Xwin or a similar utility should be procured and installed
on the workstations to provide multiple simultaneous application windows to support
development and research. Workstations representative of current and future operational
assets should be procured for future development. Future workstations should be
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configured with multiple operating systems reflecting the operating environments currently
in use by operational communities. Such configurations will allow future researchers to
maximize their research efforts (e.g. analyze fielded operating systems) and minimize the
number of single-purpose workstations. Procurement of current project management
utilities and development tools should also be considered.
Research should be conducted to determine the user requirements relating to
COTS mail applications. After this research is completed, appropriate mail applications
should be procured. Once the mail applications have been procured, the modifications
required to the mail applications and the XTS-300, or upgraded XTS-300, to allow
execution in that environment (e.g. workstation and server) must be identified and
incorporated. Such modifications may require the development of trusted software to
support expected user requirements (e.g. write-down capability to mark or delete mail at
levels strictly dominated by the current session level). Further research should be
conducted to determine HAMMS synchronization requirements for future mail
applications (e.g. simultaneous read and write accesses of files by HAMMS and mail
applications).
In order to meet expected user requirements of the high assurance server, a
network file system protocol (e.g. Network File System (NFS)) must be developed for, or
adapted to, the XTS environment. This research area will require significant software
adaptation efforts. Additional high assurance server applications (e.g. secure web server)
and their associated adaptations should be pursued.
Finally, research should be conducted in conjunction with other relevant curricula,
to determine the impact of the development of high assurance servers. This research
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should include cost analysis data reflecting personnel clearances, background
investigations, and incompatible equipment and applications. This cost analysis data can
be analyzed to determine if high assurance systems can be used to reduce or eliminate
current systems and their associated costs. This research should focus on providing an
overall DoN procurement, fielding, and support assessment.
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APPENDIX A. THE HIGH ASSURANCE, MULTILEVEL
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1. Scope.
This document describes the system level requirements of the High Assurance,
Multilevel Secure Mail Server (HAMMS) for Local Area Networks (LANs).
1.1 Identification.
This document applies to the HAMMS. The system configuration includes the
XTS family hardware architecture (e.g. XTS-300, [Ref. 2, pg. 7]) with the STOP
operating system connected, via a LAN using Transmission Control Protocol/Internet
Protocol (TCP/IP), to desktop personal computers with a network-capable operating
system (e.g. Microsoft - Disk Operating System (MS - DOS) version 6.0 and MS
Windows for Workgroups version 3.11).
1.2 System overview.
The purpose of the HAMMS for LANs is to provide a trusted, multilevel mail
service in a LAN environment. The concept of the trusted mail service is to allow the
users to view all of the user's label-based mail dominated by their current session level.
The system will support security policy enforcement with respect to both hierarchical (e.g.
classification levels) and nonhierarchical (e.g. compartments) labeled data. A high
assurance Trusted Computing Base (TCB) family will be utilized to provide a Multilevel
Secure (MLS) mail environment. The security services of the high assurance TCB that
will be targeted for reuse include security policy enforcement and supporting mechanisms,
identification and authentication, auditing, and object reuse.
Commercial off the shelf (COTS) personal computers will be used as clients to
host the COTS mail applications and serve as user workstations. Clients will
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communicate with the high assurance server via a LAN. A trusted path will be established
between the server and the client using hardware (e.g. trusted computing base network
interface card (TCB NIC)) installed in the workstation that will be used to set the session
level and invoke Secure Attention Key (SAK) (key stroke sequence to allow trusted
command input) functionality. The LAN will support, up to and including, the system
high session level, however each client-to-server session will operate at a single level.
This level will be requested by the user, communicated through the workstation-to-XTS
trusted path, and mediated (approved) by the XTS TCB. Note that due to this design
approach, either the LAN must be physically protected to a system high level of assurance
with all entities the LAN is trusted to not intercept or eavesdrop on network traffic, or
network traffic must be protected by providing secure communication services.
The XTS-300, developed by Wang Federal Inc., evolved from the Secure
Communications Processor (SCOMP) which was developed by Honeywell and received a
Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC) Al rating after evaluation by the
National Computer Security Center (NCSC). "The security features of the XTS-300 were
examined against the requirements specified by the Department ofDefense TCSEC dated
December 1985 to establish a candidate rating. The NSA evaluation team determined that
the highest class at which XTS-300 satisfies all the specified requirements of the TCSEC
is B3. Therefore, XTS-300, when configured as described in the Trusted Facility Manual,
was assigned a Class B3 rating." [Ref 2, pg. xiii]
This mail system is being developed through thesis research efforts within the
Naval Postgraduate School for INFOSEC Studies and Research of the Computer Science
Department, Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), Monterey, CA.
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1.3 Document overview.
This document has been developed in accordance with references 1 and 4, and
provides an overview ofthe system design architecture. The system capability, interface,
adaptation, and computer resource requirements are described. The qualification methods





Data Item Description, System/Subsystem Specification, Identification Number DI-
IPSC-81431, DD Form 1664, April 1989.
2. DoD TRUSTED COMPUTER SYSTEM EVALUATION CRITERIA, DOD
5200.28-STD, December 1985
3. Final Evaluation Report, Wang Federal Incorporated, XTS-300; National Computer
Security Center, FT George G. Meade, MD; 1 1 July, 1995.
4. Software Development and Documentation, MIL-STD-498, 5 December 1994.
5. XTS-300, STOP 4.3, Application Programmer's Reference Manual; Document ID:
FS92-374-04; Wang Federal, Inc., McLean, VA; July 1996.
6. XTS-300, STOP 4.3, Software Release Bulletin; Document ID: FB92-372-06; Wang
Federal, Inc., McLean, VA; July 1996.
7. XTS-300, STOP 4.3, Trusted Facility Manual; Document ID: FS92-371-05; Wang
Federal, Inc., McLean, VA; July 1996.
8. XTS-300, STOP 4.3, Trusted Programmer's Reference Manual; Document ID: FS92-
375-05; Wang Federal, Inc., McLean, VA; July 1996.
9. XTS-300, STOP 4.3, User's Manual; Document ID: FS92-373-05; Wang Federal,
Inc., McLean, VA; July 1996.
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3. Requirements.
This section addresses the system requirements.
3.1 Required states.
The states that the system is required to operate in include the following: off,
initialization, single-user, multi-user, and shutdown. The off state exists if the system is
not using electrical power. The initialization state occurs if the system is using power, the
operating system is in its boot process, and prior to the following message being
displayed: "System ready at day date month year hh:mm:ss" [Ref. 6, pg. 35]. The single-
user state exists after the initialization state occurs and prior to the execution of the
startup command. Prior to the execution of the startup command all operations must be
performed on the system console (i.e. monitor, keyboard, and mouse directly connected to
the XTS server). The single-user state is typically used for system configuration purposes.
The multi-user state exists after the startup command is executed. This command enables
the use of the SAK for all serial devices configured as terminals and loads any configured
daemons [Ref. 6, pg. 106]. The services provided by the HAMMS are not made available
to the LAN until the XTS is in the multi-user state.
The use of the SAK in the single-user or multi-user state will allow the user to be
in the trusted environment. All trusted commands must be executed from within a trusted
environment. The environment (trusted or untrusted) and current session level determine
what applications and commands are available to the user.
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3.2 System capability requirements.
The design for the High Assurance, Multilevel Secure Mail Server (HAMMS) for
Local Area Networks will support the following capability requirements:
3.2.1 High Assurance Component of Mail Handling.
The system will utilize the XTS family security architecture to maintain security
policy enforcement. HAMMS will provide the functionality to view mail at levels
dominated by the current session level. HAMMS will allow utilization of the existing XTS
read-down property to view mail at dominated levels.
HAMMS will also have an optional capability to indirectly delete or mark mail as
read at strictly dominated levels. This capability's configuration will be dependent upon
the mail application being utilized by the client (see figure 1).
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Figure 1 Mail Handling Concept
97
3.2.2 Labeling Component of Mail Handling.
The XTS-300 currently uses deflection directories to separate the mail between
session levels. The XTS mail implementation supports the creation of a deflection
directory, for each session level, but each of these directories is created with the same
name. Specifically, the mail deflection directories contain files with the users' name as the











u User(A) home directory
L U-S directories/files
visible at any level
accessible only at equal or higher session level
Figure 2 Directory Structure
When a user is logged-in, in the XTS family architecture, only the file in the
deflection directory at the current session level is visible to the user environment as the
mail file. Therefore, there is no session level unique labeling of individual mail messages
within the mail files implemented within the XTS family. However, when a user is reading
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mail existing in dominated levels there must be a method for the user to distinguish
between mail from those levels. HAMMS will contain the functionality necessary to
identify the level of the mail to the users. Additionally, the HAMMS will allow users to
view mail existing at dominated levels (i.e. levels dominated by the current session level) in
accordance with the security policies enforced by the TCB.
3.2.3 Mail Service for Local Area Networks.
A LAN will be developed through the use of existing XTS family network
interfaces, or other new service interfaces yet to be developed. A trusted path (e.g.
facilitated by a TCB NIC installed in the networked personal computer(s)) will be
established between the high assurance server and PC-based clients. A TCB NIC installed
in the networked PCs will the support the trusted path. Once logged into the XTS, the
user will be allowed to access his or her mail through mail applications residing on the
user's workstation.
Remote mail access for common commercial mail applications will be provided. A
mail server daemon (e.g. modified Post Office Protocol (POP) daemon) or similar
capability will be required (see figure 3). The remote mail server daemon will support











Figure 3 Network Configuration
3.2.4 Security Policy.
The system shall be constrained by the security policies enforced by the high
assurance platform and will include the development of subjects that will allow the
viewing and annotating of mail of differing levels. The addition of an optional trusted
subject developed for mail purposes will result in an unevaluated configuration of the
system. The XTS-300's TCB enforces Discretionary Access Control (DAC) and
Mandatory Access Control (MAC) policies. "In addition, the TCB provides a trusted path
to ensure a reliable TCB-to-user communication connection." [Ref. 2, pg. xiii] The DAC,
MAC, device labels, identification and authentication, trusted path, audit, system integrity,
and trusted recovery capabilities of the high assurance platform shall be utilized in the
development and operation of the HAMMS.
The client-to-server trusted path will be supported by a single level device (e.g.
TCB NIC installed in the workstation personal computer). This device will provide
assurance at the client to include: object reuse, secure boot process, trusted path to the
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high assurance server (i.e. identification and authentication, and session level request) (see
Figure 4). The user can request to logout, review session level, and other session-related

















Figure 4 TCB Boundary
3.2.5 Object Reuse.
Existing high assurance server object reuse capabilities shall be utilized at the
server. Similar capabilities shall be required at, and enforced for all workstations and
associated storage devices within the network configuration that actually create, delete,
modify, or store labeled objects. Mail will be stored on the server's storage devices and
the server TCB functions shall provide security policy enforcement through a coherent set
of mechanisms including object reuse for those storage devices. If the session level of the
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workstation is changed or the session is terminated, any memory utilized to manipulate
(e.g. read, write) mail objects at the workstation shall be cleared by the TCB.
3.2.6 Labels.
Existing labeling capabilities shall be utilized as currently implemented by the high
assurance TCB. The XTS-300 deflection directory structure (explained in paragraph
3.2.2.) does not attach labels commensurate with the current session level to the specific
messages within the files of that deflection directory. If there is no label on the individual
mail message then the HAMMS security policy enforcement of the individual message
must be in accordance with the label of the mail file from which it was retrieved.
Otherwise, the HAMMS security policy enforcement of the individual message must be in
accordance with the label on that message.
3.2.7 Label Integrity.
The integrity of the labels will continue to be protected by the XTS TCB.
3.2.8 Labeled Information.
The determination ofwhether a device is single or multilevel shall be made by the
TCB in accordance with the system configuration requested by the administrator. The
information stored or transferred via the devices will be labeled and protected in
accordance with implemented security policies. The level of granularity of information
labeled is at the object level (e.g. files).
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3.2.9 Multilevel Devices.
There will not be any additional multilevel devices added to the XTS family
beyond the disk devices supported. These disk devices include the XTS hard drive(s).
3.2.10 Single-Level Devices.
The TCB is utilized to control the setting of single-level devices. A single-level
device is not required to maintain sensitivity labels of information they process [Ref. 2, pg.
100]. The system administrator or a trusted subject, with sufficient rights to change the
single-level device, can utilize the set device access (sda) command to set the access level
of single-level devices. All system devices, other than the disk devices, are single-level
devices (i.e. workstation and all of its components, LAN, XTS components other than
those listed in 3.2.9).
A multilevel subject would be required to handle a single level device receiving
mail messages at multiple security levels. These mail messages might be input to the
device in encrypted format from networks external to the high assurance server's LAN
(e.g. Internet accessible networks). The subject would be required to identify and
distribute those in accordance with their associated labels and the implemented security
policy.
3.2.11 Labeling of Human-Readable Output.
The XTS family allows the system administrator to enter the labels, which will be
viewed and presented to the user. For example, the default security labels can be replaced
with labels that satisfy DoD security requirements (e.g. unclassified, secret, etc. for printed
output).
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3.2.12 Subject Sensitivity Levels.
The set level (si) command allows the user to view and change the current
sensitivity level. This command reflects the security and integrity level of the current
session and provides the user the ability to change levels. The user can change session
levels at the workstation by invoking the trusted path through the use of the SAK
supported at the TCB NIC. Multilevel subjects, required to sort incoming mail at the
server according to security labels, will have a range of access classes, defined by a read
class and write class, that spans the labels of the input stream.
3.2.13 System Testing.
The additional capabilities added to the system (i.e. XTS family, personal
computers, LAN) to support the mail service shall be tested. Specifically, additions to the
TCB shall be tested and examined (see table 1) to ensure that no undocumented or
unintentional conflicts exist with current capabilities and enforced security polices and
functions as required.
3.2.14 Configuration Management.
Changes to the system to provide the mail service shall be documented within the system
and development specifications. Any future changes to capabilities must be reflected in
supporting documentation and be maintained in a configuration library. All software
developed specifically for the HAMMS shall include configuration management control
numbers used to distinguish versions (e.g. 1 .2, where the first number denotes a major
release; second number denotes minor changes or corrections to a release). Configuration
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management control numbers, the significance of changes, corrections or releases, and
approval for such modifications shall be approved by the sponsoring authority.
3.3 System External Interface Requirements.
There are no current external interface requirements for the HAMMS system.
3.4 System Internal Interface Requirements.
The system internal interfaces will be supported by the XTS family's current
interface requirements with modifications to the interfaces as follows:
3.4.1 Interface Identification.
The XTS family network interface supports TCP/IP sessions via a thin Ethernet
connection. The original XTS-300 network connection does not allow remote login over
a network, file sharing, or mail service due to the absence of any such daemons on the
host system. This interface requirements must support remote login through the use of the
network connection to support the workstation interface (e.g. TCB NIC). An additional
interface must also support the receipt and transmission of multilevel mail. This multilevel
mail interface would support connections external (e.g. Internet) to the high assurance
server's LAN.
3.4.2 TCP/IP Interface.
To support the TCP/IP interface requirements, associated daemons supporting a
mail protocol will be required within the HAMMS that will recognize network
workstation requests for mail services. In addition, a file protocol will be required to
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provide mail file manipulation local to the high assurance server user file structure via mail
applications on workstations.
3.4.3 Workstation Interface.
Commercial off the shelf (COTS), personal computer workstations will
communicate with the high assurance server via a LAN. The workstations will employ
COTS, network capable operating systems. A trusted path will be established between the
XTS and the workstation through hardware (e.g. TCB NIC) installed in the workstation
that will be used to set the session level and invoke SAK functionality. Additionally, the
controller board (e.g. TCB NIC) shall control the workstation boot process and perform
workstation object reuse requirements as stated in section 3.2.4.
3.5 System Internal Data Requirements.
The internal data requirements will be supported and constrained by the XTS
family implementation of access control matrices and auditing. The implemented subjects
will be used to enforce the constraints on the data. Additional structures to support data
and file manipulation are specified in the HAMMS development specification.
3.6 Adaptation Requirements.
The XTS family use of labels can be adapted to include system administrator
configurable labels depending on the organizational requirements (i.e. commercial or
DoD). The system administrator, or a user with sufficient rights, can enter the specific
data for the labels to be used.
106
3.7 Security and Privacy Requirements.
There are no additional or unique security or privacy requirements, beyond those
stated in section 3.2, required for the high assurance TCB, LAN, or workstation.
3.8 System Environment Requirements.
There are no additional or unique environment requirements beyond those imposed
by the original XTS-300 system configuration. Section 3.9 addresses specific system
(hardware and software) requirements.
3.9 Computer Resource Requirements.
The computer resources required for the HAMMS include:
3.9.1 Computer Hardware Requirements.
Hardware used for system development includes the XTS family hardware ([e.g.
XTS-300 [Ref. 2 pg. 7]) and COTS personal computer workstations. Additionally, the
user workstations will require associated hardware (e.g. TCB NIC, Ethernet card)
supporting secure boot process, trusted path implementation, object reuse, and TCP/IP
connections. The hardware associated with establishing the connection and trusted path
with the XTS must be compatible with the workstation network operating system.
3.9.2 Computer Hardware Resource Utilization Requirements.
In addition to the XTS family hardware requirements, the XTS and the
workstation hardware must be capable of maintaining network connectivity (e.g. TCB
NIC) and provide the processing and memory capability to support executing software
required for the system's operation.
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3.9.3 Computer Software Requirements.
The software requirements for the XTS family includes the STOP operating
system, planned compatible upgrades, server daemon software (e.g. POP server daemon),
and mail services software. Required workstation software includes: network capable
personal computer operating system applications, personal computer compatible TCP/IP
communications applications, personal computer compatible X Windows terminal
applications, and mail applications. Any workstation with compatible architectures and
upgraded versions of these operating systems and applications should provide sufficient
resources to satisfy system requirements.
3.9.4 Computer Communications Requirements.
The communications requirements include the communication applications stated
in the section 3.9.3. Any communications applications supporting TCP/IP network
communications with the XTS family and the workstation will satisfy the communications
requirements.
3.10 System Quality Factors.
Any software, specifically developed for or affecting the user workstation, should
be executable, at minimum, with all workstations of the compatible architectures,
operating systems, and mail applications.
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3.11 Design and Construction Constraints.
There are no additional design or construction constraints beyond those previously
defined in this document. However, additional functionality and capability provided by any
future upgrades to this system should be documented in the appropriate specifications.
3.12 Personnel-Related Requirements.
Workstation support software related to any session connection will be restricted
to support one user at a time per workstation. There are no additional constraints beyond
its LAN connectivity and processing capabilities.
3.13 Training-Related and Logistics-Related Requirements.
Any additional, or modifications to existing, system administrator functions
relating to system configuration will be documented in the associated specifications.
3.14 Other Requirements.
If additional or existing capabilities are created, modified, or deleted, the
associated specifications must be developed and updated as appropriate.
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4. Qualification Provisions.
The system requirements identified in section 3 will be qualified via the methods
specified in Table 1
.
Table 1 Qualification Requirements and Methods
Nv Method
Requirement n^
Demonstration Test Analysis Inspection
3 1 X X
32 1 X X
322 X X
323 X X X
324 X X




329 X X X
3 2 10 X X X
3 2 11 X X
3 2 12 X X
32 13 X X X
3 2 14 X
33 1 X X X X
332 X X X X
34 X X X
3 5 X
36 X
3 7 X X
3 8 X
3 9 1 X X X X
392 X X X X
393 X X X X
3 94 X X X X
3 10 X X
3 11 X
3 12 X X
3 13 x X
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4.1 Test Cataeories
Demonstration: The operation of the system, or a part of the system that relies on
observable functional operation not requiring the use of instrumentation, special test
equipment, or subsequent analysis.
Test: The operation of the system, or a part of the system, using instrumentation or
other special test equipment to collect data for later analysis.
Analysis: The processing of accumulated data obtained from other qualification
methods, (i.e. reduction, interpolation, or extrapolation of test results)
Inspection: The visual examination of system components, documentation, etc.
Ill
5. Requirements Traceabilitv.
In accordance with reference 1, requirements tractability does not apply to system
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APPENDIX B. APPLYING THE SYSTEMS ENGINEERING
PROCESS TO COMPUTER SECURITY
A. INTRODUCTION
A traditional method for defining the requirements of a high assurance system is to
specify the individual components with formal mathematical languages, then integrate
those components' specifications into a system-level specification; the bottoms up
approach [Ref. 4]. This type of approach has contributed to the production of systems
that did not meet the end users' requirements of the system. Another factor contributing
to unfulfilled user requirements is that after the initial submission of the system
characteristics, the user would not be consulted for assistance in the requirements
definition and development decisions. The Department of Defense (DoD) developed a
methodology to produce systems that meet users' requirements and systems that are
readily upgradable. That process has been adopted by the commercial sector as an
engineering standard and is being used throughout industry. This methodology is known
as the Systems Engineering Process (SEP).
B. SYSTEMS ENGINEERING
1. Background and Definition.
The Systems Engineering Process, as described by the Electronic Industries
Association (EIA) standard, IS-632, is currently being used throughout national
engineering communities, both in government and in commercial programs. The SEP is
an iterative process that can be applied to the entire life cycle of a program and can also be
applied to each phase of the life cycle. Life cycle refers to the phases a project must go
through, from the initial conception through the development, support, and disposal of a
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fielded product. The SEP can be applied to produce any system or sub-system, software
and/or hardware. The main concept behind the process is to start with an abstract idea of
a system and to divide the abstraction into sub-systems. The sub-systems are then also
subjected to the SEP where these sub-systems are subsequently reduced to smaller sub-
systems or functions. The SEP continues, recursively, until the system is decomposed into
definable detailed elements. This process is directly applicable in the production of secure
systems.
Secure systems require their components to be specified in detail for verification
and validation. "Trusted computer systems must be carefully evaluated and tested during
the design and development phases and reevaluated whenever changes are made that
could affect the integrity of the protection mechanisms" [Ref 12, p. 62]. The SEP does
this level of testing and reevaluation for changes with all systems and requires precise,
comprehensive documentation detailing the components of the system. The process
produces concise definitions for interfaces, which enable system upgrades and the insertion
of additional modules. The SEP also continuously monitors the system development to
ensure that the requirements are being satisfied.
The Systems Engineering Process is best depicted by Figure 19. The figure depicts
the four major processes including Requirements Analysis, Functional Analysis/Allocation,
Synthesis, and Systems Analysis & Control. Each of these processes represents a distinct
SEP level, however each interacts with the others through the various feedback
mechanisms. These mechanisms, or loops, help to ensure the requirements are being met,
the system development is in concert with the associated specifications, and the system
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Figure 19 Systems Engineering Process From Ref. [13, p. 10]
2. Requirements Analysis.
Requirements Analysis considers the users' requirements, objectives, and needs.
This phase then considers the users' operational environment, mission, and desired system
characteristics to define the system requirements. The requirements are performance
oriented. They stress what the system is supposed to do, not how the system
accomplishes the requirement.
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The Requirements Analysis phase is the most critical phase within the SEP. If the
customers' needs are not clearly defined, then a deficient product may be produced. This
can lead to costly upgrades, or possibly a non-useable system being developed and fielded.
3. Functional Analysis/Allocation.
Functional Analysis/Allocation translates requirements into functional components
or sub-systems. The functional components or sub-systems are iteratively reintroduced
into the SEP to decompose these elements into lower-level functions or sub-systems.
Throughout this process of reintroduction, the Functional Analysis/Allocation works with
the Requirements Analysis phase to ensure the requirements defined at the higher levels of
the decomposition are applied to all subsequent decompositions of the functional
components to ensure the requirements are being satisfied.
4. Synthesis.
Synthesis is the translation of the functional decomposition's into an actual
physical architecture. During this phase, the detailed specifications and the respective
interfaces are defined. The extent to which the system/sub-systems are detailed is
dependent on the type and detail of verification that is required.
5. Systems Analysis and Control.
Systems Analysis and Control is the check and balance component of the SEP.
This step ensures that decisions are done logically and interactions are as seamless as
possible. Whenever there is a question on the selection of alternatives, the Systems
Analysis phase conducts trade-studies to produce educated decisions. This phase also
conducts comparisons between the performance and functional requirements to verify that
all requirements are being met. If there is a change in one functional area, the Systems
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Analysis and Control phase ensures the change is propagated correctly throughout the
system. A significant part of the Control phase is annotating and revising all
documentation to ensure consistency throughout the entire system development.
6. Teams.
One of the main principles supporting the SEP is the employment of a team
approach. "There is a great need at certain crucial times in many system developments to
bring together the different communities" [Ref. 7, p. 204]. Regardless if the DoD term,
Integrated Product Team (IPT), or some other terminology is used, a development team is
required. The development team consists of representatives from every
department/organization that will have interaction with the system. The team is composed
of design, production, legal, logistical, administrative, and other support personnel. Each
of the members is an integral part needed to ensure that the system is meeting
requirements and is designed in such a way as not to incur unreasonable upgrade or
support costs. In most cases, one of the more important members, if not the most
important member, will be the user. Without clear representation from the user
community, the developer may produce a system that does not meet the users'
requirements.
7. Summary of SEP
Each one of the steps in the SEP helps to define the system and produce the
correct product for the user. Designing systems without including users' inputs and
considering users' technical abilities has the potential of creating systems that are not
usable and cannot be understood or operated by anyone other than the design engineer.
The SEP also ensures that the system will perform according to the specified requirements
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and that all of the system specifications and the final product are clearly documented in a
detailed manner. Proper documentation at all levels is important for future upgrades,
engineering changes, technical manuals, and users manuals.
Most of the basic security requirements for high assurance systems, ones which
require some level of non-disclosure (secrecy) or integrity assurance, are well documented
in the DoD technical evaluation publications (i.e. the rainbow series) relating to secure
systems, and in particular, the Department ofDefense Trusted Computer System
Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC) (Ref. 12, a.k.a. the "Orange Book"). These represent the
requirements that must be met in order to pass an National Computer Security Center
(NCSC) evaluation to achieve a TCSEC security rating. The 7 class ratings that can be
achieved under the TCSEC are D, CI, C2, C3, Bl, B2, B3, and Al . Class D has the least
and Class Al has the most stringent security requirements.
The SEP will help to ensure all of these security requirements and all of the user
requirements are achieved when there is no conflict between requirements. When there is
conflict between requirements, the SEP will help the developer make educated decisions
regarding which requirements can be satisfied.
An important part of the evaluation process is the supporting documentation (e.g.
formal models and specifications). This is especially important if the trusted system is
going to be evaluated for a high assurance rating such as Class Al.
This appendix will demonstrate how to utilize the SEP to create secure system
architectures. The process may be applied to the entire development life cycle of a system
or to any portion of the life cycle. There will be comparisons and references to the life-
cycle phases, but the appendix will emphasize the SEP.
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C. REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS
In the initial stages of the system, the Requirements Analysis involves the
translation of the users' requirements and needs into performance requirements for the
system. This is vital to the success of not only security architectures but all projects. The
better defined the project, the less likely it is that time critical upgrades or changes will be
required. With respect to security projects, considerations of the types of security policies
to be enforced are added to the requirements.
1. Basic Requirements.
When defining the initial system during the early stages of the system life cycle, the
essential user requirements are analyzed. Some of the basic considerations relate to
mission, threat, and objectives. These elements are defined in the Mission Needs
Statement for DoD systems. The needs are translated into high-level system requirements
to define the system. The requirements should be performance oriented, to clearly specify
what the system is supposed to do to meet users' needs. Once the high level requirements
are defined, a thorough search is conducted to find possible alternative existing systems or
changes in operational procedures that may meet the needs of the user without the
development of a new system.
2. Sub-System and Function Requirements Definitions/Specifications.
As the system is decomposed into sub-systems and functions by the Functional
Analysis/Allocation phase, the requirements from the system or parent, are applied to the
functions or sub-systems, to define their limitations and requirements. As in the system-
level definition, the requirements continue to be performance oriented, clearly specifying
what the function or sub-system is supposed to do to meet the requirements of the parent.
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The requirements are defined in such a way that will be measurable and testable. The
development team ensures the requirements from the parent are divided among sub-
systems or functions. If certain requirements encompass more than one sub-system or
function, then teams or individuals working on the sub-systems or functions work closely
together to ensure requirements are being met and that there are no conflicts between the
elements. To achieve this, working level teams may be created that report to the
development team regarding all decisions made on the interactions between the functions
or sub-systems.
During this phase, it is important to specify the requirements in sufficient detail.
Short comings in specifications will result in generic, rather than specific, requirements.
Over-specifying at such a high level, specifying how to meet requirements rather than
what the requirements are, will make the requirements too restrictive resulting in the
possible exclusion of current or future technologies. For example, there may be better
methods than magnetic tape to store backup information. Specifically requiring such tapes
may not allow for the use of storage disks.
3. Specification.
The requirements are documented in an applicable specification. References [11]
and [25] are military specifications standards and define common formats for system level
specifications. The highest level of specification, most abstract, has been known
traditionally as the 'A' Specification. It is currently known as a Systems or Subsystems
Level Specification in reference [25] or as a Performance Specification in reference [11].
The format for both is generally the same. Reference [25] is obviously software oriented
and requires different definitions in the associated requirements section.
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The specification is submitted for sponsor, or higher authority, review to ensure
the requirements specified by the user are being supported. The specification then
becomes the product baseline for the remainder of the engineering cycle. Changes at the
system level should be avoided as the system is decomposed and the requirements for the
sub-systems or functions are developed and refined. High level changes after the system
specification has been defined could possibly have severe, adverse affects on all sections of
the system and further complicates configuration management due to the ripple effect a
change may have throughout other sub-systems' or functions' design and documentation.
This is why requirements must clearly define a system that meets the users' requirements.
4. Secure Architecture Requirements.
When developing a secure system, the requirements for the policies and
regulations that the system must meet should be defined early. The TCSEC provides
developers with the overall standards for the different levels of system assurance. One of
the requirements for Classes B2 and above, is to develop a clearly defined and
documented formal security policy model. The model is developed to specify
mathematically the policy the system will enforce. Security requirements for the system
can be derived from the model (e.g. discretionary access control). The requirements
placed on the system represented by the model, are combined with the users' mission
requirements/objectives along with the operating environment of the system to provide the
overall set of requirements the system is to meet.
When considering the environment, the skill level of the user is studied carefully to
adequately define the interface for the user. Too often, user friendly interfaces are not
considered in complex secure systems.
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There will be requirements that conflict. For example, the user may want to be
able to operate in two different security level simultaneously where the formal security
model says one level at a time. In this case a risk analysis is done to determine if the
security requirement can be eliminated or a system constraint is placed on the users'
interface to meet the security requirement.
5. Interfaces.
Interfaces are important in all systems. The more strictly defined the interface, the
information content, and the modules utilizing the interfaces, the easier it will be to
incorporate future upgrades. If the system interface is clearly defined, any changes to the
non-interface functionality of the system should not affect other interfaced systems. Due
to the importance of having clearly defined interfaces, it is essential to define the
requirements for the each interface in the system, sub-systems, and functions during the
Requirements Analysis Phase.
6. Policy/Requirements Flow.
As the system is iteratively decomposed, requirements are defined for the separate
functions or sub-systems. The requirements are directly mapped to the requirements
defined at the system level. The development team must continue to ensure that the
security policies and regulations established at the system and sub-systems levels are being
correctly implemented within the functional and component level. This is accomplished by
tracing the requirements back to the baseline that was established at the system level. Part
of this process is implemented by working together with the other design teams who are
working on other functional components to ensure proper interface and security
consideration implementation.
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The tracing can be accomplished by utilizing a matrix to map the requirements of
the parent, in this case the system, to the children (i.e. the functional components). To aid
in this time intensive endeavor, there exist automated requirements-handling tools.
Appendix G of reference [18] offers a number of examples of automated tools for system
design, some specifically have requirement tracing capabilities. One product is the
Requirements Driven Design, which is being developed to exchange information with
another product, the INFOSEC Design And Analysis Tool (DDAT). IDAT is a product
that specifically addresses security issues and requirements. [Ref 18, p. G-14]
In the final stages of the decomposition, the requirements continue to be refined
for the system into smaller sub-systems along with a constant tracing of the security
requirements back to the original system level requirements definition. The development
team continues to ensure that the interfaces and protocols meet the system security
requirements.
7. Summary
The Requirements phase of the SEP for the system as a whole, or for sub-systems,
is the most important part of the system development. Without properly defined
requirements, the system definition may be other than one that meets user needs in the
operational environment. The fielding of unusable systems leads to costly upgrades in
order to make the system usable or the possibility of scraping the system entirely. Having




The Functional Analysis/Allocation phase directly follows the Requirements
Analysis phase. The Functional Analysis/Allocation phase's emphasis is on defining the
functional architecture. The functional architecture is "the hierarchical arrangement of
functions, their internal and external functional interfaces and their respective functional
and performance requirements, and the design constraints" [Ref 13, p. 45]. Once the
functional areas are known and the interfaces are defined, the functions may be
decomposed into smaller functions. The decomposition is accomplished by reintroducing
the sub-system or function back into the SEP and working with the Requirements Analysis
phase to iteratively decompose the system into its smallest elements. During each iteration
of decomposition, all design constraints and requirements from higher levels are
considered. This causes the continuous reevaluation of what is being done to ensure
requirements are being met. The Functional Analysis/Allocation phase also works
iteratively with the Synthesis process to help define functional architecture alternatives
that can be translated into feasible physical architecture to ensure the constraints and
requirements are also being satisfied there. In the early stages of the life cycle of the
system, the Functional Analysis deals with 'what' the functions are supposed to do. In the
later stages, the Functional Analysis deals with 'how' the functions are implemented.
1. Working With Requirements Analysis.
The Functional Analysis/Allocation process works iteratively with the
Requirements Analysis phase to define the operational and performance-driven
environment. The development team examines all of the performance requirements from
the parent, and divides and allocates them among the functions or sub-systems. When
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developing a secure system, this phase is where the trusted requirements for the system
(e.g. authentication and authorization) are ensured to be defined in the proper trusted
functions or modules leading to the establishment of the Trusted Computing Base (TCB).
The development team will also examine the functions and modules to ensure that
requirements that do not need to be trusted are not in the trusted functions or modules.
This will reduce the number of lines of code that have to be evaluated. "The essence of
trusted computing bases is that security-relevant components are separated from security-
irrelevant components, which do not need to be trusted with respect to security" [Ref. 7,
p. 226].
2. Sub-functions.
The Functional Analysis/Allocation phase takes the system level functions or sub-
systems and iteratively decomposes them into sub-functions to satisfy parent requirements
utilizing the entire SEP for each level of decomposition. This involves the modularization
of the software. "Modularizations include the design decisions which must be made
before the work on the modules can begin." [Ref. 2, p. 1054] Proper modularization
allows for ease of analysis, testing, and individual compiling of modules by allowing the
programmers to develop new modules without affecting other existing modules. Such
modularization has the obvious advantage of allowing system upgrades. Upgraded
modules can be interchanged with the previous modules without affecting the unchanged
modules as long as their interfaces and the functional requirements for the module have
been met. Modularization is not only a good design practice, but it also meets the
requirements for a high assurance system. "The TCB shall be internally structured into
well-defined largely independent modules" [Ref. 25, p. 49].
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3. Interfaces
As the sub-systems, functions, and sub-functions are defined, all of their interfaces
are clearly identified and defined (e.g. strongly typed) to provide improved
modularization. Specifically, the interface properties (e.g. data format and security label)
are examined to insure proper security requirement representation (e.g. access control
attributes and device settings).
The TCSEC requires all systems' interfaces between modules (modules are
required for TCSEC ratings Class B2 and above) to be documented for systems seeking a
rating of Class CI or above. "If the TCB is composed of distinct modules, the interfaces
between these modules shall be described." [Ref. 12, p. 14.] A Guide to Understanding
Design Documentation in Trusted Systems (a.k.a. the burgundy book), Reference [5],
specifically requires that all interfaces, whether hardware, firmware, or software, shall
describe the types and sources of information passing between TCB modules, and
between TCB modules and other system modules external to the TCB. [Ref. 5, p. 19]
Part of the documentation required for TCSEC Classes B2 and above is the
Descriptive Top-Level Specification (DTLS). The DTLS specifies, in a natural language
(e.g. English), all system level interfaces that communicate with user applications and the
transformations that occur. "The DTLS provides evaluators with a better understanding
of the implementation of the reference monitor and provides maintenance personnel with
the necessary documentation to correct, modify, or augment the TCB without destroying
the TCB's cohesiveness and internal consistency."[Ref 5, p. 12]
The documentation required for Class Al systems includes a DTLS and a Formal
Top-Level Specification (FTLS). The FTLS is similar to the DTLS in defining the
128
functions' interfaces and transformations, however the FTLS is " a top-level specification
that is written in a formal mathematical language to allow theorems showing the
correspondence of the system specification to its formal requirements to be hypothesized
and formally proven." [Ref 12, p. 113]
4. Flow Diagrams.
Data and control flow diagrams are developed to show the data and process flow
between functions. These diagrams should cover every state and mode for all possible
operations performed on, or within, the system for all of the possible configurations (e.g.
administrative, privileged, user, storage, etc.). The initial state is the secure initial state
defined in the formal model. [Ref. 12, p. 113]
These data and control flow diagrams can also be applied to high assurance
security systems. For example, systems requiring covert channel analysis (i.e. Classes B2
and above) can utilize flow diagrams as a method of graphically depicting possible
information channels.
The control flow diagrams may include timing sequence diagrams, which show
the timing of the state changes. These timing diagrams can be valuable when analyzing the
system for overt or covert channels between trusted and untrusted functions in all possible
scenarios. Covert Channel Analysis is a TCSEC requirement for systems being evaluated
at Class B2 or above. [Ref. 12, p. 97]
5. Logistics Support.
An integral part of the Functional Analysis/Allocation process is the development
of the logistics and support functional requirements. By working with the supply and
logistics personnel, the development team can anticipate and eliminate unnecessary
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complications. Developers of Class Al systems are required to ensure the proper
distribution of the TCB and software, and provide the ability for the user to test for the
correct version of trusted systems code and their updates. [Ref. 12, p. 51] If a Class Al
system is required, then it is during Functional Analysis/Allocation process that the trusted
distribution requirements can be identified and planned for prior to system fielding.
Often computer components may be sensitive and they will require special storage
and handling (e.g. encryption devices and their keys). These requirements result in
overhead for storage and processing which translates into cost to the user. The systems
may also be sensitive to shipment or vibration, which may limit where or how they can be
used or transported. By defining these requirements in the functional design period, the
other members of the design team will be able to tailor their functions and sub-systems
accordingly, or at minimum, allow the user to know what the requirements for storage and
processing are prior to delivery as opposed to after receipt.
System support also applies to upkeep, training, and disposal. The level of effort
required for the system administrator to maintain the system must be determined to
establish design constraints relating to usability (e.g. how complex is a user interface).
The required ease of adding/upgrading components must be determined, to again place
constraints on the system design. High assurance systems have the reputation of being
hard to use, even with training. By defining, from the outset, how much training will or
should be required for an administrator or users to do their jobs, system constraints may
be placed on the human interface development and allow for the customer to plan on
sending people to appropriate training.
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As with all computer systems, high assurance systems and their components on
occasion will fail. For secure systems and their components, special procedures for their
disposal must be in place. This is especially relevant for mass storage and crypto devices
that may still contain sensitive information, even after removal from the system. The
manufacturers can not position themselves to handle all disposals because they may not be
cleared for access to the information that is or was stored on the device. The sensitive
components must have design constraints to make them easily disposable without a lot of
effort on the users part. In addition, disposal procedures must be developed for any
hazardous material utilized within, or in the production of, the system. All of these
support areas must be closely examined to avoid costly changes in the system design or a
costly infrastructure for the customer.
6. Summary
Use of the Functional Analysis/Allocation process brings the system one step
closer to being a reality. It permits the decomposition of the system into a functional
architecture and fosters consideration of the design constraints for the system, sub-
systems, functions, and sub-functions. The process is used to define functional
requirements in the system requirements specification and to define new specifications for
the sub-systems. It also presents the parent performance requirements and the functional
requirements to the Synthesis phase.
E. SYNTHESIS
Synthesis is the final step in the decomposition of the system. The development
team takes the low level functions and components, and develops detailed system designs
to achieve the performance and functional requirements established in the Requirements
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Analysis and Functional Analysis/Allocation phases. This is accomplished iteratively with
Functional Analysis/Allocation to define the complete set of detailed designs. As the low-
level components are defined, they may be applied to the parent function to help define the
parent's architecture. This allows for the recursive integration of the entire system. The
system design is mapped to the system requirements to ensure all user, mission, and
operational requirements are being met.
1. Alternatives.
Different design alternatives are developed for the various functions and
components. Alternatives are developed and pursued to provide the development team
with best possible product via design and trade-off analysis. The design can result in
detailed specifications which may include detailed schematics, blue prints, and system
characteristics for hardware components. For software components, the result can be a
detailed specification stating such information as design decisions, system constraints, the
programming language structure, and interface inputs and outputs. A requirements
matrix is used to check the alternatives to ensure compliance with the functional and
performance requirements.
2. Models and Prototypes.
Models and prototypes are developed from the possible alternative designs to
model the reliability and maintainability of the system, sub-systems and components with
respect to operational, performance, and functional requirements. By checking the
reliability of the alternatives, the team can determine if redundant systems, sub-systems
and components will be required. If it is a high value sub-system or component, one that a
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large portion or the entire system depends on (e.g. an authentication checker), or a high
failure sub-system, then redundancy should be considered.
3. COTS Components.
During the Requirements Analysis phase, complete COTS solutions were
considered as material alternatives to initiating a new development program. During the
Synthesis phase, use of existing commercial products are considered in lieu of producing
components/elements. The use ofCOTS components can reduce production,
maintenance, testing, and logistics costs and schedule of the system.
In secure systems, the components must be previously evaluated or verifiable if
they are to be part of the TCB. This could present problems if the product has not been
previously evaluated under TCSEC requirements. To perform the evaluation the product
design specifications must be purchased, which could be very costly and/or hard to obtain
if the vendor does not want to sell the specifications. Such documents may not even
exist.
4. Design Trade-Off Studies.
Design trade-off studies are conducted to determine which COTS products or
design alternatives will be used. Each design alternative is evaluated against the parent
requirements and design constraints to determine which is the best choice with respect to
cost, schedule, and performance. Designs that are found to be non-compliant are
removed from consideration. The items that best support the requirements are kept, but
the others that were compliant are also maintained. For example, entire systems may be
developed by competing sources for a competitive performance evaluation (e.g. dual
aircraft production during development for competitive fly-off). This also applies to the
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systems' sub-systems, functions, and components (e.g. competitive production of aircraft
rudder design) to maximize use of existing technology and sources of design and
production. The compliant items that are not selected may prove to be useful in the event
that, during integration or further decomposition, the chosen design proves to be a poor
choice.
5. Foundation Architecture.
Often when systems are being developed, designing those systems to allow for
future upgrades is not a high priority or even considered. Such shortsightedness leads to
legacy systems that cannot be easily upgraded. With this in mind, the development team
will take the components which they have determined to be the best selections and create
the basic architecture (e.g. cabinets, connectors, processor, operating system, etc.). This
leads to the development of the definition of the Foundation Architecture. The
Foundation Architecture consists of those components that will change the least. The
intolerance to change may be due to requirements or laws of physics. These are the
components that are not going to change easily throughout the life cycle of the system. It
is important to establish the Foundation Architecture to allow for the adoption of new
technology and future upgrades during the product's life cycle. With the basic design
locked in, the sub-contractors or other component development teams can continue to
improve the component design without the concern of basic architectural changes. For
example, in software development, once an operating system is chosen (e.g. UNIX or
Windows) the teams can usually count on the basic functions remaining compatible in the
future. [Ref. 16, p. 33]
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6. Hazardous Material.
When selecting designs for physical hardware, hazardous material handling and
disposal must be addressed again. As stated in the Logistics Support section, when
selecting any components that are made of, or produced with, hazardous materials, the
developer must consider the cost and method of handling and disposal of the hazardous
waste, be it component or production waste.
7. Manufacturing Preparation.
The Synthesis process is not only used for the design of the end item but is also
used for the design of the manufacturing process of the system. The production members
of the development team will be making plans and suggestions on designs to ease
manufacturing. While producing prototypes, they are making their designs for tooling and
plant layout. In traditional systems development, often the tooling and manufacturing is
not even considered until of the final design is established, which can lead to complex
manufacturing designs and unusual tooling. This also applies to secure systems with
respect to hazardous materials and the in-house production/assembly of systems.
8. Summary
The Synthesis process has brought the requirements into the actual detailed design
of the system and started the preparation for manufacturing. There are several outputs to
this process. The physical characteristics of each item are established in some electronic
form and kept under strict configuration management. Schematics are produced for the
entire system, again under configuration management. Finally the physical architecture of
the system is baselined and indicates the final design. This includes all interfaces,
arrangement of components, and the physical characteristics of the system as a whole.
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F. SYSTEMS ANALYSIS AND CONTROL
Systems Analysis and Control is conducted in conjunction with the other processes
of the SEP. The Analyses are the trade-studies and cost effectiveness. Control is
concerned with risk management, configuration management, interface management, and
data management.
1. Trade-Studies.
Trade-studies are conducted in all three of the previously discussed phases within
the SEP. During the requirements section they are used to help make decisions on the
requirements that will meet users' requirements, security policies, and the rest of the teams
areas of expertise. In the functional section, the studies are used to evaluate all of the
functions and their interfaces with the other functions and their external interfaces,
ensuring all meet the design constraints and performance requirements determined in the
requirements process. During the synthesis phase, trade-offs are used to choose between
alternatives, establish baseline configuration, and evaluate the impacts of all material and
processes used to produce the components and the end product.
2. Risk Management.
Risk management is an important part of any program. It is during this phase that
risk management is applied to the products, processes, and their interrelationships. The
first step in risk management is to identify the risks to the system or project. Risks are not
only threats, but they are also any possible occurrences, that can adversely affect the
system or system development schedule. Once the risks are identified for the system, they
are evaluated to determine the likelihood and the probable damage in the case of
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occurrence. After the probability of damage is determined, how the risk will be handled is
addressed. The risks can be eliminated, reduced, accepted, or ignored.
Risk management applies not only to the development of the system but it also
applies to the system after fielding. In high assurance systems there will be situations
where risks may be accepted for the benefit of cost and performance. For example, in
covert channel analysis, eliminating timing channels can seriously degrade the system
performance. A manufacturer may therefore suggest that the user, to achieve higher
performance, assume the risk of allowing the covert channel to be exploited.
3. Management.
From the commencement of the system development process, there has to be some
method of data management. Some record of what was discussed in meetings and a
record of all decisions made on the system must be maintained. As designs are
established, configuration management is applied to control all changes. Configuration
management is an extremely important part of high assurance system development for
TCSEC Classes B2 and above. There must be a system in place to ensure that any
changes made to the current configuration are documented throughout all specifications,
design documentation and source code [Ref. 12, p. 96]. The objective is to control who
makes changes to a design and to update all engineers and other components that are
concerned when there is an update in the system. This process is used to prevent the
wrong people from deliberately or inadvertently making changes to the system design, and
to make sure approved changes are proliferated through the system. The same concerns
apply to interface management. Once an interface is established, it is crucial that the
interface doesn't change without the concurrence of all authorized users of that interface.
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4. Summary
The Systems Analysis and Control process ties the other processes together. In
some instances, it is utilized to establish and conduct testing of the system. In other
instances, it is used to verify that all requirements established are communicated to the
required components.
G. CONCLUSION
The SEP system was designed to reduce the life-cycle cost of new systems by
reducing the number engineering changes in production and the number of upgrades in the
field. It also makes the systems inherently easy to upgrade through strict configuration
management and modular design with strict control on the interfaces between modules.
1. Requirements.
The main focus of the SEP is the definition of the requirements. The more well
defined the requirements, the less likely it is that changes will be required. A driving force
in defining comprehensive requirements is the active participation of all members of the
team, and most importantly, the user.
2. Functional Analysis.
The functional analysis takes the requirements a step further and develops the
functional requirements which lead to sub-systems and functions. This turns into an
iterative process until all functions are designed. Throughout the process, requirements
flow to lower-level components remains essential. The independent internal modules of a




The Synthesis results in the detailed design of the system. Every component is
clearly defined to a level of detail required by the team. In software production, detailed
specification languages are used to prove complex algorithms and logical design in
complex systems prior to code development.
4. Systems Analysis And Control.
Systems Analysis and Control are accomplished throughout the SEP. The analysis
is the testing and verification that the system is doing what the requirements indicate it
should. It also helps in the decision making process of trying to decide on alternatives and
trade-offs between cost, schedule, and performance.
The final outputs of the SEP are the system baseline and specifications. In the
computer security community, the specifications are used to baseline the system for
development. The SEP first abstracts the system and then iteratively decomposes it into
manageable pieces that require supporting specification. All system decisions that were
made are documented and, in conjunction with all schematics and diagrams, used to
develop the system. These elements make the upgrade process, for any system that has
used the SEP, very feasible and results in a system that meets user requirements.
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APPENDIX C. MEDIA ENCRYPTION MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
(MEMS) WITH MESA/MEDIA ENCRYPTION BOARD (MEB)
A. INTRODUCTION
This appendix addresses the Media Encryption Management System (MEMS) use
of the Mykotronx™ Mesa Media Encryption Board (MEB) and the Mesa Initialization
Program (MIP) . Specifically, the appendix includes: an overview describing the
functionality provided by the encryption board and supporting software and hardware; the
required hardware, software, and associated architectures; precautions that should be
taken when operating with the system in a networked environment; a description of
possible uses of the system; a detailed listing of the setup instructions. The final section of
the appendix is a step-by-step instruction set for the installation, configuration and use of
this encryption system with the hardware and software listed verified through several
complete initializations of the system.
B. OVERVIEW OF MEMS/MESA
This media encryption system includes an encryption board and control software.
The encryption board provides encryption services and the control software redirects data
to and from the board prior to storage and retrieval. This system can be used to control
the boot process of the host computer and to encrypt data stored on non-volatile magnetic
media.
Prior to actually using the system, the MEB must be initialized. This process can
be accomplished by the system administrator or by the user possessing sufficient rights and
access to the system and associated cryptographic keys. The MIP overwrites the Personal
Initialization Number (PIN) that was loaded during the manufacturing process prior to
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initial shipment of the MEB. There are no actual Media Encryption Keys (MEKs) loaded
during the manufacturing process to prevent use of the MEB prior to initialization.
Likewise, there is no Cryptographic Ignition Key (CDC) present on the MEB prior to
execution of the MIP. The CIK protects the keys on the MEB when the MEB is not in
use. [Ref. 19, p. 3]
The MIP loads the keying material, the user and the Staff Security Officer (SSO)
selected PINs, and generates the CDC for the MEB. Successful execution of the
application level MTP enables operational use of the MEB. A listing of the actual steps
and user responses required for successful initialization of the MEB is included in the final
section of this appendix. This specific listing of the initialization process is applicable to
the system configuration described in the following sections of this appendix. [Ref. 19, p.
3]
MEMS is the software, which utilizes the MEB, to encrypt and decrypt all data
going to or from the designated media devices. MEMS intercepts all requests by the OS
for data manipulation on a media device.
Upon successful execution of the MTP and MEMS, the MEB has been initialized,
keys have been generated for encrypting data, applicable software has been loaded, and
the target storage device (e.g. all or a portion of the hard drive or the whole floppy drive)
has been encrypted. The storage device is accessible via securely booting the host
computer with the Artifact disk discussed in the following section. Upon completion of
the secure boot process, an encrypted portion, or all, of the storage device can be used to
store data.
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C. HARDWARE & SOFTWARE
There are two associated components for the encryption of non-volatile media: the
Cryptographic Peripheral (CP) and the control software. The CP can be any
cryptographic device that satisfies the MEMS interface standard. In this case, the MEB is
being utilized but there is also a provision for FORTEZZA applications. The MEMS is
the control software, which controls the flow of all information to and from the media
where the encrypted data is stored. [Ref 27, p. 1]
1. Hardware
The system tested was a desk top computer (i.e. 80486 architecture) using MS-
DOS® version 6.0 and MS® Windows™ for Workgroups version 3.11. The MEB is
available as either an Industry Standard Architecture (ISA) card or a Peripheral
Component Interconnect (PCI) card. The ISA configuration is currently being utilized for
this research.
The MEB fits into a standard PC ISA expansion slots. There are two dip switches
to set the address for the board to function in memory (see Figure 20). One dip switch is
for the I/O addressing and one is for the Basic Input/Output System (BIOS) address, and
is not used. The I/O address selected must operate in cooperation with any other I/O
devices such as Network Interface Cards (NICs).
A NICs address must be set both on the hardware and in the network
communications software. Depending on the NIC, the address may be set physically, as
the MEB is, or there may be software to set the address on the board. Regardless, the
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address must also be set in the network software. In this research situation, Win 3.11
Network Setup is utilized to configure the I/O address for the network software.
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Figure 20 MEB Dip Switch Settings
The MEB is initialized using the MO*. As previously discussed, the initialization
includes the assigning of passwords to the administrator and user, creating of CIKs, and
generation of keys. After the MEB has been initialized and keys are loaded or generated,
the MEB is ready for use by the controlling software.
2. Software
MEMS encrypts all data destined for the targeted storage media. This is
accomplished by the MEMS software intercepting OS requests for access to the encrypted
storage device. The architecture ofMEMS is depicted in the shaded area of Figure 21
.
The architecture is broken down into four components:
• Intercepting Device Drivers (EDD)













or MEMS Control Software
Non-removable Removable
Storage Media Storage Media
Hi Support Utilities
Figure 21 MEMS Configuration From Ref. [28, p. 1]
The IDD captures all data transfers between the OS and the storage media. Any
requests made by the OS are passed on to the CS. The CS determines the required
actions to fulfill the request based upon whether the request is a read or a write, and
whether the media being addressed is encrypted or not. The CS passes any requests
involving encrypted media to the CP for decryption or encryption for read and write
operations respectively. All accesses to the CP are via the CS to provide access control.
[Ref. 27, p. 2]
The Monitor verifies the security ofMEMS on a periodic basis. The time interval
used by the Monitor is set by the SSO. At the designated time interval, the Monitor
compares the stored checksum, generated by the Logon application when the CS is
initially loaded, to the re-computed (i.e. by the Monitor) checksum of the CS code space.
In addition, the Monitor performs similar checksum comparisons for integrity checks of
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the IDD to insure all data is being intercepted prior to reaching the media device. [Ref. 27,
pp. 4, 18] Similarly (i.e. checksum comparisons), after a designated number of read and
write access requests, the CS also provides an integrity check of the Monitor [Ref. 28, pp.
22, 26-27].
The Logon application invokes MEMS and allows user access to the encrypted
data. Without the Logon process the user may see encrypted volumes on the hard drive as
large files but when accessed, the files will be unreadable. The Logon process uses an
Artifact floppy disk created by MEMS when the SSO configures the system with the SSO
application. [Ref. 27, p. 5]
The Artifact disk is a specifically configured system boot disk which contains all
files and information required to boot the workstation, authenticate the user, and provide
access to the encrypted media. On the disk, in addition to the required files to boot a PC,
are the encryption configuration file, the Logon application, and in the case of the MEB
configuration the user's CDC file. As a safeguard, the configuration file is encrypted.
Within the configuration file are the checksums for the configuration file, workstation, and
bootfiles. [Ref. 27, pp. 14-15]
The Artifact floppy is used to boot the workstation. During the boot process the
Logon application is executed. The Logon application prompts the user for a PIN that is
passed to the CP. Once the CP is unlocked, the configuration file is passed from the
Artifact to the CS, which in turn decrypts the configuration table. The Logon application
verifies the checksums of the configuration table (obtained from the configuration table),
and the checksums of the boot sequence control files, CMOS, and BIOS against the saved
checksum values on the Artifact. [Ref. 27, pp. 14-15]
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Once the Logon application is complete and the CP is unlocked, the system is then
ready for use. Any encrypted volumes will appear to the user as additional accessible
drives. Disk drives that are encrypted in part, or in their entirety, appear to be normal
drives to the user. Due to the lack of unique labeling for encrypted drives, users may fail
to realize or recall that the encrypted drives store sensitive data. This may lead to
vulnerabilities resulting from users unknowingly sharing encrypted drives and sensitive
data in the networked environment.
D. PRECAUTIONS FOR OPERATING IN A NETWORK ENVIRONMENT
An environmental architecture common in the DoD is the networked PC
architecture. Many PCs are networked to shared hardware and software resources
between operational users. Due to the characteristics of the network environment, there
are precautions that should be considered prior to, and during, the use ofMEMS in such
an environment.
The research revealed that there are some possible configurations ofMEMS in a
LAN environment that may lead to security vulnerabilities. IfMEMS is installed in a
workstation that is connected to an unsecure LAN, MEMS does not stop a networked
user from sharing the encrypted drive if the host system was booted to use MEMS. Once
the drive has been unlocked and shared, it appears to the LAN as just another drive
accessible to anyone with which the drive has been shared.
Even if the user is educated to not share an encrypted volume or drive, there is still
a possible vulnerability when sharing an unencrypted drive containing an encrypted
volume. An encrypted volume on a unencrypted drive appears as a file, designated as
stacvol.dsk, on a shared hard drive. This file represents the encrypted portion of the
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device that will be used as the designated address for storing the sensitive data. On an
unsecure network, this vulnerability can indicate which computers on the network have
encrypted volumes and where to focus attack efforts or to simply delete the files resulting
in the denial of service.
There are some obvious solutions to these vulnerabilities. First, educate the user
or configure the workstation to not share drives that are encrypted or the directories that
contain encrypted volumes. Second, insert a script file, into the boot files to be placed on
the Artifact, to disable the network card while running MEMS. Third, place workstations
that will contain sensitive information on secure LANs only. However if the LAN is
encrypted then this alternative requires another CP per workstation. Additional CPs are
required due to the fact that if one application logs a user off a CP then all applications
utilizing that CP will be logged off. Therefore, if applications or users have been logged
off a CP, use of an additional CP would insure that specifically assigned applications
remain active. Alternatively, development and use of an additional MEMS IDD that
intercepts data as it is being passed to the network driver and then routes it through the
CP for encryption prior to transfer to the NIC would allow multiple, simultaneous use of
a single CP. This additional IDD could support the transfer of information between the
client and server to allow the user to store information on remote drives.
E. POSSIBLE USES/MODIFICATIONS
When trying to connect workstations via a LAN to a high assurance server there
must be assurance in the workstation hardware and software providing the workstation-
to-high-assurance-server trusted path. This trusted path must provide a direct
communications path between the workstation and the TCB on the high assurance server.
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A trusted path, required for Class B2 and above systems, must insure that this
communications path does not rely on any of the untrusted layer of software on the
workstation or the high assurance server. This trusted path would provide identification
and authentication, access to trusted commands, and other security services for the user of
the workstation. The research conducted has revealed possibilities for the use of the
MEB/MEMS configuration in establishing a trusted path and other TCB functionality for
the workstations in the high assurance LAN.
The MEMS may provide functionality that can be incorporated in the development
of a workstation TCB NIC. Specifically, the MEMS provides a trusted boot process. The
trust is placed in the Artifact disk and the CP. As previously discussed, the Artifact disk
contains all of the necessary files to boot the computer and it also includes encrypted files
containing verification data that the boot files on the Artifact were not changed. This
functionality could provide support for the direct communications path to the high
assurance server and identification and authentication services required.
In addition to the Logon application, the Monitor application also aids in insuring
system trust. As previously discussed, the Monitor insures all data being transferred
between the OS and storage media is being captured by the IDD and sent to the CS for
encryption. It also checks the CS for proper operation on a periodic basis. The checks
insure there is no malicious code bypassing the CS and IDD. This functionality could be
analyzed to determine if it supports the system integrity checks required by reference [12].
The additional network IDD could be utilized as a link encrypter to encrypt all
data leaving the computer via the NIC. It may be possible to further extend this IDD to
accept the user PIN and userid during the Logon process and pass them to the secure
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server in a Telnet session to log the user into the secure server. This would require that
the PIN be maintained in the workstation/Artifact disk and the secure server.
Alternatively, the information provided by the Artifact disk could be maintained on the
secure server and accessed from the workstation via the trusted path [Ref. 27, p. 14].
Another system variation could include a script file within the Autoexec.bat file
that would activate after successful MEMS logon to the workstation. The script would
prompt the user to input the userid, PIN, and desired session level access on the server.
This information would be passed via Telnet session to the server, which would use the
information to log the user in at the desired session level, provided all of the information
was authenticated. After the workstation is logged into the secure server the user would
be allowed to access the information, in accordance with the implemented security
mechanisms, from that session level through applications running on the server (e.g. NFS,
POP).
A security vulnerability results from operating in a networked environment. Once
logged in at the server, if there is only one CP for the server using one key for the
network, then there may be opportunities for workstations to intercept traffic for, or from,
other workstations.
One possible solution may be to modify the network IDD to allow traffic to and
from a certain IP address (i.e. the secure server) only. This would force all
communications to go through the server and prevent direct communications between
workstations. There may be some additional security policy restrictions for configuration
of workstations necessary, such as the disallowing of shared drives on workstations.
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F. SETUP INSTRUCTIONS
Text = Computer displayed messages/information
Text = Action required
Install MS DOS ver 6.0
Install MS Windows for Workgroups ver 3.11
Format two floppy disks and label 1.) "SSO CDC disk" 2.) USER CDC disk"
Install NIC diagnostic program (Ethernet Adapter diagnostics Program V2.22a ATI)
Install MEB board
Turn off power
Open PC physical case
Insert MEB into open slot (full slot)
Set dip switches to 310
Install NIC
Insert NIC into open slot (full slot)
Set dip switches to 340
Close PC physical case
Apply Power
Boot the PC
Exit Windows to DOS prompt
Setup NIC I/O Base and IRQ
Run diag.exe
Select Setup Hardware
Set I/O Base to 340h (corresponding to NIC dip switch setting)
Set IRQ to 11
Select OK and then Exit diag.exe program
Launch Windows





Set Interrupt (IRQ) to 11




Select 0£ to message indicating System.ini file modifications.
Select Restart Computer
Enter Ctrl-Alt-Del when prompted
After reboot, exit Windows to move to DOS prompt
Place MESA V.0.3b 4 Apr 97 disk in A: drive
type A:\mesainst\mesainst.exe and Enter
Mesa setup screen displayed; Press any key to continue
Please enter the SSO PIN: enter ZeroizedCard if message is displayed indicating that
MEB is a zeroized card else go to next step
Please enter the SSO Pin: (default = Mesa else previous SSO PIN)
Select Change PIN
Select SSO
Please enter Old PIN (default =Mesa, else previous PIN)
Please enter New PIN
Please re-enter new PIN




Please enter new PIN (if first time for configuring this PIN else user will have to enter old,
new, and re-enter new PINs if actually changing the PINs)
Please re-enter new PIN
Pin has been changed, press any key to continue
Press any key to continue. This will continue the MEB initialization and re-login as SSO
Please enter the SSO PIN:
Is the MEB going to generate Keys (Y/N) ? Enter Y
Select Create CIK Split File
Create an SSO or User CIKfile. Select SSO
Insert a diskette in the A drive. (SSO CIK disk)
Press Enter to continue or any other key to abort ....
Writing the CIK to the diskette ... Press any key to continue....
Select Create CIK Split File
Create an SSO or User CIK File. Select USER
Insert a diskette in the A drive. (USER CDC disk)
Please Enter to continue or any other key to abort ....
Writing the CIK to the diskette ... Press any key to continue....
Select Create or LoadMedia Key
You must log in as the SSO and activate the SSO CIK before creating keys or loading
shared keys. Press and key to continue. . .
.
Please enter the SSO PIN:
Please insert the SSO CIK disk into the A drive andpress any key ....
Where do you want to get the new keyfrom? Select Create a New Media Key
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Enter key register index (1 -31):
Press any key to continue ....
Is# (# = number entered in previous step) the correct key register (Y/N)? Enter Y if
appropriate.
Enter the name of the key archivefile: Enter keyU.bin (# = number entered in previous
step; this is not a specific naming convention required, however this scheme is useful)
Key Created and stored in the file. Press any key to continue
Select Quit. Are you sure? Y
***** MEB initialized, SSO, and USER CIKs created and stored to disk. *****
System defaults to drive that mesa was launched from (e.g. C or A). Move to C drive if
not already there and launch Windows.
Put MEMS for MESA installation disk ver 1.07 dated 10 Jan 97 in drive A:
Choose File, Run. Enter a.install
This will installMEMS administration Application Release vl.07 Copyright(c) 1996
Spyrus Inc. Select Install.
MEMS administration Application Release vl.07 will be copied to: C:\SECADMIN
Select Ok
Files will be copied from MEMS disk to C:\ SECADMIN
Wouldyou like me to create the program itemsforyou? Select Yes
MEMS administration Application Release vl.07 has been installed successfully. Select
Ok
System returns to Windows MEMS program group.
Launch Notepad in Accessories. Open Config.sys. Add following as last line in file:
DEVICE=C:\SECADMINFORTEZZA.SYS. Save the file and open Autoexec.bat. Add:
C:\SECADMIN\CRYPTSER.EXE prior to WIN command. Save the file and exit Notepad.
Remove MEMS disk from A drive
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Label a blank disk as "Artifact disk" and insert A drive
Go to Main, File Manager, Select Disk, Format Disk, Select Make System Disk, Select
Ok. Warning that all files will be erased; select Yes to continue.
Exit Windows
Remove the Artifact disk that was just created.
Reboot the computer.
Loading Cryptographic Server Code vl.07d (Mesa) (C) Copyright 1996 by SPYRUS Inc.
All rights reserved Press any key to continue....
Go to Main, File Manager. Put USER CDC disk in A drive. Copy a:\usecik.bin to
C:\SECADMIN. Select Yes. If there are any network drives connected to the workstation
being encrypted, disconnect those drives by selecting Network Drive Icon, select the
drive, select disconnect. Exit File Manager.




There must be three lines of 14 characters each plus a carriage return at the end of each of
the three lines. There can be any characters on each line but there must be EXACTLY 14
followed by a carriage return. Save the file as: C:\SECADMIN\SHARED.BIN
Go to MEMS, Security Administration.
Enter PIN: Enter USER PIN. Select LOGON
Logon Successful
Select Security Option, Host Settings.
*****Do no select Ok in any of the following actions until the last step*****
Under Removable Volumes, select Removable volume, select Drive A:
Under Removable Volumes, Volume Settings, Read Options, select Plain-text Media.
Under Removable Volumes, Volume Settings, Write Options, select Plain-text Media.
Under Removable Volumes, select Removable volume, select Drive B:
Under Removable Volumes, Volume Settings, Read Options, select Both Encrypted and
Plain-text Media.
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Under Removable Volumes, Volume Settings, Write Options, select Both Encrypted and
Plain-text Media.
Under Fixed Volumes, Volume, select Drive C:
Under Fixed Volumes, Volume Size, Enter 10 (e.g. Number of megabytes that you want
to reserve for encryption).
Check that there are no additional fixed volumes available for selection. If there are,
select Drive, Volume Size, No Encryption.
Under Access/Configuration, BIOSMOS Verification Failure Options, select Display
Warning if verificationfails.
Under Access/Configuration, Bootfiles Verification Failure Options, select Display
Warning if verificationfails.
Under Access/Configuration, Re-configuration Option, select Allow security setting
modification after configuration.
Under Access/Configuration, Userformatting options, select AHow user toformat/create
secure volumes.
*****SeIect Ok *****
Select Security Options, Convert System: Verify that settings are as listed above.
Remove USER CIK disk.
Select Convert.
Insert Artifact disk as requested.
Select Go.
There will be several minutes of delay before the user is questioned whether he wants to
continue. Select Continue.
Type a: \Convert at C prompt and Enter.
Boot process messages and Norton Utilities functions displayed. Boot process will restart
again.
Enter userpassword:
Hashing and boot messages displayed.
The following message will be displayed:
A:\filldiskC:
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You are about toJill the C drive!
Do you wish to continue? (Y/N) Enter N
Conversion process completed. Press any key to continue. . .
.
System will reboot in secure mode if Artifact disk is left in floppy drive.
Enter user password:
Do you wish to has the bootfiles? (Y/N) User can enter either option.
Crypto Server Already Installed!
Press any key to continue....
Boot process to Windows continues..
Notice Pulsing Heart Icon on Desktop. The computer has been successfully booted in the
secure mode.
Under Main, File Manager, notice that the D drive has been added. This drive represents
the secure volume. That drive can now be used similar to other hard or floppy drives to
create, store, modify, and delete files.
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APPENDIX D. SUBVERSION OF A FORTEZZA-ENABLED
PLATFORM
A. INTRODUCTION
Due to frequently changing organizational work environments, there has been a
significant increase in users' requirements for data sharing via various network
configurations. Today's users may coexist on the same network, in the same physical
environment, or they may interoperate between multiple heterogeneous networks spanning
diverse geographical regions. Secure data exchange has become extremely important to
organizations due to the dispersion of organizational components and due to the increase
in electronic data available and essential to support mission requirements. The Multilevel
Information System Security Initiative (MISSI) has emerged "... to make available an
evolving set of solutions that provide secure interoperability among a wide variety of
missions that compose the Defense Information Infrastructure (DII)." [Ref. 21]
1. Background of MISSI
The intent ofMISSI is to provide information systems security capabilities in
support of a wide range of end user environments as well as various network
configurations. Specifically, the security capabilities that this initiative proposes include:
Integrity - absolute verification that data has not been modified in
transmission;
Identification & Authentication (I&A) - verification of the originator of a
transaction, similar to the signature on a check or a Personal Identification
Number (PIN) on a bank card;
Non-Repudiation - undeniable proof of participation by both sender and
receiver in a transaction, such as a bank transfer;
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Confidentiality - privacy of data with encryption during transmission or
computer processing, such as scrambling text for transmission or data
separation during processing;
Availability - ensuring that data transmission or computing processing
systems are not denied to authorized users. [Ref 21]
The FORTEZZA crypto card component ofMISSI provides the vast
majority of these security services. It is possible for FORTEZZA to be integrated
into high assurance systems. However, the majority of end-user configurations
employing MISSI will consist ofFORTEZZA coexisting with a commercial
operating system of, at best, a low assurance level.
The majority of end-users will employ MISSI (with FORTEZZA and
FORTEZZA-enabled applications), utilizing a workstation with a DOS, Windows,
or UNIX operating system, to protect Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU) data.
Since the MISSI implementation layers FORTEZZA and FORTEZZA-enabled
applications (email, web browsers, file storage, remote login, file transfer, etc.) at a
higher logical layer than the operating system, understanding the assurance of the
underlying operating system is fundamental to assessing the level of confidence
that should be placed in such an implementation.
2. Overview
The most widespread use ofMISSI is, or will be, protecting SBU data. There has
been, and will continue to be for the foreseeable future, a tremendous increase in the use
of applications that process this SBU data, such as email, file sharing and web browsers.
Assessing the implementation of an initiative such as MISSI may provide valuable insight
regarding how a significant amount of data will be protected in DoD. This appendix will
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serve to identify areas of concern relating to a MISSI configuration that was examined,
present the details of a successful subversion attack against that configuration, and to
provide a conclusion regarding the trust that should be placed in that configuration. The
specific intent of this appendix is to identify areas within the MISSI configuration that may
present security concerns and provide an example ofwhy a high assurance base is required
for systems processing sensitive data.
B. SUBVERSION
Attacking or subverting a system requires an understanding of the actual
implementation of the system of interest. Simply observing the implemented configuration
in operation can provide significant indicators of where a subvertor might focus his
attention. However, a sound understanding of the theory and mechanisms used in the
implementation of the system components can significantly reduce the resources required
for successful subversion.
A key consideration in a subversion attempt is to identify the 'weakest link' of the
system. If there is not a method of controlling the system configuration and providing
protection of critical components, then the subvertor's task is greatly simplified. In this
case, a critical component is the unprotected operating system. This section will describe
the configuration tested, the attack approach, and the actual attack against that underlying
operating system.
1. Configuration
The hardware and software configuration on which the tests were conducted
included: Toshiba Pentium laptops; FORTEZZA PCMCIA crypto cards; XIRCOM
Credit Card Netwave adapters; DOS version 6.22 and Windows for Workgroups 3.11
161
configuration for networked or non-networked systems. The DOS file, config.sys,
presented an interface menu to allow the user to choose between non-networked,
networked or secure networked environment modes of operation. Upon user entry for
configuration selection, the autoexec, bat file would then execute the appropriate sequence
of files for the desired system configuration. The only difference between the networked
and the secure networked configuration were two files called by the secure mode,
mark.com and ciltsr.exe, and the network driver in the non-secure mode, winpkt.bat. All
of the network, PCMCIA, and operating system drivers were already loaded prior to those
files being called.
2. Attack Approach
Subverting the FORTEZZA card or any encryption device could involve a long
and detailed process, possibly requiring physical tampering of the actual device.
Reference [3] describes several attack methods which involve physical tampering with an
encryption device. Such methods of attack require the attacker to first obtain the device,
and then reverse engineer the associated drivers and possibly the actual encryption
algorithm if this device was supported by a high assurance operating system. Such an
approach is not necessary when the encryption device resides on an untrusted platform
hosting an untrusted operating system with no means of configuration management of the
hardware or software.
There are a number of methods to attack a system absent of a reliable security
base. An initial approach could include a data driven attack through a macro or file
attachment to penetrate the system. Once inside, the malicious code can overwrite any
number of executables, drivers or batch files to give the user a false sense of security that
162
all transmissions from that computer are secure. The attack that was successfully tested
was an attack on the FORTEZZA initialization process and the files that implement that
initialization process. An actual implemented configuration ofMISSI was obtained to
verify the attack efforts.
3. The Attack
An overwrite of the ciltsr.exe file in the FORTEZZA directory, within the host
computer, achieved the desired effect of spoofing the user. The file was overwritten with a
C++ program [see Section 0], developed to present an interface to the user indicating that
the FORTEZZA card was being initialized. The name of the C++ program developed was
also ciltsr.exe to prevent direct editing of the autoexec.bat file, avoiding obvious
detection. It should be noted that there was no antiviral software resident on the
configuration examined that could be used to detect changes in such critical files.
By simply observing the screen, the user has no indication that the encryption has
not been enabled. Timing mechanisms, coded within the program, were developed to
control the speed of the printing of all text to the screen so as not to alert the user of the
subversion in progress. The program provides all of the expected text and then requires
the user to provide the PIN for the FORTEZZA card. The PIN appears to the user as
asterisks, as in the original FORTEZZA initialization program. The subversion program
then accepts the user entered PIN and writes it to an output file (possibly a shared file),
created by the subversion program.. The output file (gotpin.dat) is saved on the hard
drive of the computer being subverted for possible retrieval. After the PIN is captured the
user is falsely informed that the login attempt was successful.
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This attack can be proliferated throughout several computers on a wireless
network with a single broadcast. After some or all of the users on the network have been
subverted, additional applications enabling network traffic analysis can be employed.
Freeware network analysis applications, acquired from the Internet, can support the
subvertor's efforts to capture all of the information packets being passed along the
wireless network. All of the spoofing operations are transparent to the user. Once
installed, no user would be aware of the subversion unless there is some implementation of
a network monitor in place. By the time such a monitor or administrator detected the
subversion, some or all of the PINs for the individual FORTEZZA cards could already
have been compromised. If such a MISSI laptop was actually stolen, the perpetrator
could effectively log into the network, remove the subversion software, and eavesdrop on
the encrypted traffic.
C. CONCLUSION
There are methods of attacking systems based upon system configuration,
assurance of the specific components, and management of the system. Weaknesses within
a system lacking a high assurance base can greatly impact the essential elements of data
protection. Although the encryption algorithms and engines, key management, and device
implementation may appear sound when considered individually, the overall system
implementation must be examined to accurately determine the level of trust and assurance
that should be associated with such a system.
If the system can be subverted in the manner described then the security services
addressing integrity, identification and authentication, non-repudiation, confidentiality, and
availability are circumspect. Spoofing the user (i.e. falsely believing that he is using a
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secure network), allows for viewing and capturing plaintext data which permits
modifications of that data by a potential subvertor. Capturing and storing the user's PIN
defeats the identification and authentication mechanisms perceived to be in place and
compromises the FORTEZZA card. This also allows for a subvertor to masquerade as an
authorized user, thereby introducing significant doubt in the system's non-repudiation
capabilities. Capturing the PIN, allowing executable code to planted locally or via the
network, and failing to prevent modifications to files controlling the host boot process
certainly raises questions regarding whether system resources can be denied to authorized
users.
A basic principal accepted in computer security is that the level or cost of
protecting the resource should be commensurate with the value of the resource being
detected. Although the MISSI implementation subverted is intended to protect SBU data,
capturing significant amounts of that data or gaining control of the system storing the data
may provide an unacceptable advantage to adversaries or opponents. It is the
implementation of the underlying host system that is critical to the security of the overall
system.
The operating system is a key component of the security base of secure systems.
The implementation of the operating system must be such that it allows a layered approach
with the essential security mechanisms residing at the lowest possible layers of that
implementation. The structure of the operating system provides significant indicators that
should be used to inform users of the level of trust appropriate for that system. At an
absolute minimum, software should be employed to alert the user that subversive
modifications were attempted and prevent those modifications. Without an actual secure
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base for the system, however, subversion is easier than it should be thus decreasing the
value of security mechanisms placed at higher logical layers.
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D. SUBVERSION SOFTWARE
yy************************************* + + * + ***** + *************.(<*********
//
//File: ciltsr.cpp
// Name: LT James P. Downey, LT Dion A. Robb
// CS4910 Directed Study
// Operating Environment: WIN 3.11, MS-DOS ver 6.22
//Compiler: Borland C++ for WIN ver 4.5
//
// Description: This program subverts the FORTEZZA initialization process within
// MISSI
//
// Input: User provided PIN for associated FORTEZZA card
//
// Output: The output file "gotpin.dat is created to store passwords retrieved








// Simulates host screen display speed
void simLapTopO;
// Opens output file to capture pin; Returns for failure, 1 for success
int openFile(ofstream &);
// Writes captured PIN to output file
void outWritePin(ofstream &);
// Simulate actual PIN entry; '*' displayed when password entered by user
void readNoEchoQ;
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const long MAX_LOOP = 60000;
const int LOOP_NUM = 5,
FAILED_OPEN = -l,
MAX_LENGTH = 256;
const char OUT_FILE[] = "gotpin.dat"; // output pin file
char clearLine[MAX_LENGTH] = {'\n'}; // used for invalid data
char getPin[256];
// Function: main
// Return Type: int
// Parameter: None






cout« "Output file did not open!!!" « endl;
return FAILEDOPEN;
}
cout « "Cryptologic Interface Library DOS TSR Version 0.03 (951 129)"
« endl;
simLapTop();
cout « "Initializing Fortezza..." « endl;
simLapTopO;
cout« "A Fortezza Crypto Card was found in slot # 1 " « endl « endl;
simLapTop;
cout« "Manufacturer Name = Group Technologies Corporation" « endl;
simLapTop();
cout« "Product Name = FORTEZZA Crypto Card" « endl;
simLapTopO;
cout « "Processor Type = ARM60" « endl;
simLapTopO;
cout « "User RAM = 65536" « endl;
simLapTopO;
cout « "Largest Block = 65472" « endl;
simLapTopO;
cout « "Key Regs = 10" « endl;
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simLapTopO;
cout « "Certificates = 35" « endl;
simLapTopO;
cout « "Crypto Card Flag = 1 " « endl « endl;
simLapTopO;





cout« endl« endl « "Login successful!" « endl;
simLapTopO;
cout « "The Network Key has been successfully loaded." « endl;
simLapTopO;
cout « "Ready for encryption and decryption." « endl;
simLapTopO;




// Return Type: void
// Parameter: None
// Purpose: To simulate the host screen display speed
void doLoopO
{
for (int ix = 0; ix < LOOP_NUM; ix++)
{









// Return Type: int
// Parameter: ofstream &out output file
// Purpose: To open the output files for capturing the pin and return
// the status of whether the file opened or not
int openFile(ofstream &out)
{










// Return Type: void
// Parameter: ofstream &PinFile















// Return Type: void
// Parameter: None
// Purpose: To read the user entered PIN, echo '*', and store in getPin[]
void readNoEcho()
{
int ex = 0;
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